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ABSTRACT
GREEK CYPRIOT REARMAMENT 1974-1998:
AN ASSESSMENT
Tunç, Alımla
Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Gülgün Tuna
August 1999
This thesis aims to analyze the rearmament o f the Greek Cypriots between 
1974-1998. In the beginning, the C)'prus problem is explained in order to base the 
current situation o f the island on healthy ground. Detailed information has been 
obtained from the Greek Cypriot Press Abstracts about the weapon purchases o f the 
Greek Cypriots and the analysis has been made under the light of that information. 
The thesis evaluates the effects of the Greek Cypriot rearmament on the Turkish- 
Greek balance and on the Cyprus conflict. It also assesses the impact o f the Greek 
Cypriot rearmament and the Cyprus conflict on the quest for the security system in 
the Eastern Mediterranean.
Ill
ÖZET
KIBRISLI RUMLAR’IN SİLAHLANMASI 1974-1998:
BİR DEĞERLENDİRME
Tunç, Alımla
Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Assl. Prof. Dr. Gülgün Tuna
Ağustos 1999
Bu tez Kıbrıslı Rumlar’ın 1974-1998 yılları arasındaki silahlanmalarını 
analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Başlangıçta, Kıbrıs’taki şu anki durumu sağlam bir 
temele oturtmak amacıyla Kıbrıs sorunu anlatılacaktır. Daha sonra, Kıbrıslı 
Rumlar’ın silah satın almalarıyla ilgili detaylı bilgi verilecektir. Analiz ise Rum 
Basın Özetleri’nden derlenen bilginin ışığı altında yapılacaktır. Bu tez aynı 
zamanda Kıbrıslı Rumlar’ın silahlanmalarının Türk-Yunan dengesi ve Kıbrıs 
sorunu üzerindeki etkisini de değerlendirecektir. Tezin sonunda, Kıbrıslı Rumlar’ın 
silahlanmasının ve Kıbrıs sorununun Doğu Akdeniz’de oluşturulmaya çalışılan 
güvenlik sistemi üzerindeki etkisi analiz edilecektir.
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A B im iiV IA T IO N S':
ЛАРС: Advanced Armour Personnel Carrier 
ACV: Armoured Combat Vehicle 
AD Guns: Air Defence Guns 
AIFV: Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle 
APC: Armoured Personnel Carrier 
ATGW: Anti-Tank Guided Weapon 
ATK: Anti-Tank Weapons 
('MBs: Confidence Building Measures 
ПС: liuropean Community
EOKA: Ethnike Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organization o f Cypriot 
Fighters)
EU: European Union 
G.D.P.: Gross Domestic Product 
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization 
МВТ: Main Battle Tank 
mm: millimeter 
MOR: Mortar
MRL: Multiple Rocket Launcher
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
RCL: Recoil less Rifle
RECCE: Reconnaissance Vehicle
RL: Rocket Launcher
SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile
SP ARTY: Soft Point Artillery
SSM: Surface-to-Surface Missile
TMT: Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (Turkish Resistance Organization)
TOWED ARTY: Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided Artillery 
TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
UN: United Nations
UNFICYP: United Nations Force in Cyprus 
US: United States
'1 he informalioii about the abbreviations about the defence equipment is taken from Melek Suat. 
1996. Selected Ahbrevialions-Acwnyms for Defence Industry. Ankara: Pelin Ofset
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INTRODUCTION
Cyprus is said to be the place o f birth of Aphrodite, the Goddess of Beauty 
and is lanious for the beauty of its nature and coasts. Paradoxically, it has been the 
place of long lasting conflicts and violence throughout its unfortunate history. As it 
is located at a significant strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, it has 
attracted a dozen different civilizations into the island. Egyptians, Greeks, 
Phoenicians, A.ssyrians, Persians, Ptolemies, Romans, Byzantines, Franks, Venetians, 
Ottomans and British ruled the country in different periods and contributed to the 
history, culture, population and politics o f the island.
Recent developments, such as the Greek side’s application to the EU and its 
intention to bring Russian origin surface-to-surface missiles (S-300s) into the island 
increased the significance of the island in the international agenda. In order to be able 
to anal3'ze the situation more accurately, it-will be useful to describe briefly the 
history of the Cyprus conflict.
This thesis will examine the effects of the Greek Cypriots' rearmament 
efforts on the political and military balances between Greece and Turkey. What 
are those efforts? How are they shaped? What is the significance o f the political 
interests regarding this rearmament? How will these efforts influence the existing 
status quo in the area?
In the last few years, the Cyprus problem has gained importance again. As 
one of (he most enduring conflicts of (he world, the Cyprus conflict attracted the
allentioii o f tlie United Stales and, liius, numerous special representatives started 
to visit the island in the search for a solution to the problem by negotiation.
In addition to this, the Greek Cypriots' decision to deploy S-300s in the 
Cyprus theatre and the completion of the Paphos Air Base which will enable the 
landing of Greek military aircrafts on Cyprus caused strong and harsh protests 
from Turkey. These protests increased the tension in the area and caused debates 
in these three countries: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.
Accordingly, this thesis will give an enlightening information about the 
rearmament of the Greek Cypriots and will also analyze its effects on the 
contemporary events. Thus, it will be an informative thesis that could be useful 
for future analyses.
In Chapter I, a brief history of the Cyprus conflict is provided. In order to 
be able to analyze the situation more accurately, it will be useful to describe 
brielly the history of the Cyprus conflict. Mow did the Cyprus conflict emerge? 
How did the violence start? The first chapter will also include the reasons of the 
destruction o f the Republic of Cyprus, the influence o f British colonialism and its 
"divide and rule" polic}· on the Cyprus island, the intercommunal talks that were 
started with the emergence o f the first fightings and continued until today. In the 
first chapter, there will be an information about the Confidence Building 
Measures and the Set of Ideas of Ghali. As the application o f the Greek Cypriots 
for membership in the EU has been one of the most important aspects of the 
Cyprus question in the last few years, the thesis will also evaluate the effects of 
the EU on the Cyprus problem.
Cliaptcr I also includes a description of the recent developments and 
itiiliatives by the UN and the US to find a negotiated solution to the Cyprus 
problem.
Chapter II is an analysis of the history of rearmament of the island. Starting 
from the first armed conflicts, the island of Cyprus has been subject to intense 
rearmament and this has resulted with an island that is filled with hi-tech weapons 
and with thousands o f soldiers that are seen by many as the most important 
barrier obstructing peace. Information is provided about the military purchases 
of South Cyprus starting from 1974 until today. Domestic developments, 
political and economic considerations will also be included as they are the main 
factors that shape their rearmament. Information about the weapon purchases is 
available starting from 1974 because the environment and political climate were 
such that it would be unhealthy to try to analyze the rearmament efforts before 
1974. The p ie -1974 period was a time o f chaos and secret rearmament of the 
underground organizations. The analysis will begin with 1974 and will cover the 
period from 1974 to 1999.
Chapter III evaluates the effects of the Joint Defence Doctrine (1993) on 
the Lausanne Balance and on Turkish-Greek relations. First, the Lausanne Treaty 
(1923) is described. Then, the Joint Defence Doctrine, signed between Greece 
and South Cyprus in 1993, is analyzed.
In Chapter IV, a summary of the first three chapters of the thesis is 
included. Then, an analysis of the Greek Cypriots is made. There is a comparison 
of the selected ecjuipment o f the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot sides in 
order to show the existing balance between the two sides. The S-300 crisis and 
its results arc evaluated in a section. In the last part o f Chapter IV, the evaluation
of (he equipment and (he rearmament policy of the Greek Cypriots is made. Tlie 
aims o f the rearmament are discussed in (he Conclusion. In addition, (he effects 
of the Cyprus problem and the Greek Cypriot rearmament on the security of the 
Eastern Meditci ranean region are described in the Conclusion..
1.CHAPTER I:
THE CYPRUS CONFLICT
The first Turkish settlers sailed to the island of Cyprus after the Ottomans 
completed its conquest in 1572. Since then, nearly for 400 years, 7'urks and Greeks 
shaied the culture, environment and fate of the island and formed the Cypriot 
community. Nevertheless, bicommunality has been an important characteristic of the 
Cypriots. The roots of bieommunality lie in the Ottoman system of MILLET. The 
dominance of the Orthodox Church over the Greek population helped them to 
preserve their religious, ethnic, cultural, and political identity’. The MILLET system 
of the Ottoman Empire, that continued its existence practically after the end of the 
Ottoman period, was the biggest assistant to the "divide and rule" policy of the 
British that entered into the island in 1878. The division along linguistic, ethnic, 
cultural and religious lines has been strengthened with the help o f the "divide and 
rule" policy of the British Empire that has been used in all other colonies of the 
Kingdom. During the Ottoman and British periods, Cypriots kept alive their links to 
their respective motherlands and this prevented the development o f a strong Cypriot 
identity that could be a possible barrier against the future division o f the island.
The dream of ENOSIS (union) with Greece existed among the Greek 
communily of the island since the period o f the Ottoman Empire. ENOSIS 
(annexation o f Cyimis with Greece) is one part o f a grand ideal o f the Greeks that is
called MBGAld IDEA. It aimed at the recreation of the Byzantine Empire that 
would also include the Hellenistic Orthodox communities scattered throughout the 
Balkans, (he Aegean and Asia Minoi".
/. /. The Bc\i’innin}> of Violence:
In 1878, when the Ottomans transferred the administration of the island to 
Britain, many Greeks hoped that the British would hand over Cyprus to Greece\ 
But it didn’t take long for them to realize that the British had no intention to 
renounce Cyprus. Nevertheless, the efforts o f the Greek Orthodox Church to 
achieve ENOSIS continued and were repressed by the British army and police force 
during the colonial period. The measures taken by the British against the rebellions 
also influenced the Turkish population living there as restrictions were imposed on 
both of (he communities. The Greek efforts to turn Cyprus into a Greek island were 
detrimental to Turkish Cypriots and ‘all Turkish Cypriots believed that what was 
freedom for the Greek Cypriots was enslavement for the Turkish Cypriots’'*. Under 
these circumstances the Ethnike Organosis Kyprion Agoniston, EOKA (National 
Organization of Cypriot Fighters) was formed in 1955 under the leadership of 
General George Grivas who would later become the puppet president o f the junta in 
Cyprus after the coup. EOKA started its activities against both communities. 
Between 1955-58, nearly 100 Turkish and 400 Greek Cypriots (who were against
‘ .loscph S. .loseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. (London; Macmillan 
Press, 1997), 17.
■ Ai istos Aristotelous, Tlie Military Balance. 199.5-1996: Greece. Turkey and Cyprus. (Nicosia: 
Cyprus ( ’enter For Strategic Studies, 199.5), 52.
Pierre Oberling, The Road to Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus. 
(New York: Columbia Uniyersity Press, 1982), 14.
' Necati Ertekiin, The Cyprus Conflict. (Oxford: K. Rustem & Brother, 1984), 2.
ENOSIS) were killed by the terrorist activities of the organization. As a reactionary 
movement, Turks started to support the TAKSİM (partition) policy and established 
their own underground organization d'iirk Mukavemet Teşkilati, TMT (Turkish 
Resistance Organization). In the beginning, the Turkish Cypriots were hoping that 
the existence o f the British within the island was a guarantee and a source of security 
for them. When they realized that the UK was only concerned with her own colonial 
interests, they had no chance but to protect themselves via the underground 
organization that was secretly supported by Turkey. TMT was established in 
November 1957 and was more modernized and organized than its amateur ancestors 
such as VOl.KAN'.
With the existence of two opposing underground organizations and 
increasing rearmament and terror, the island was running towards the de facto 
partition. Under these circumstances, Cypriots entered into negotiations to establish 
the Republic of Cyprus.
1.2. The Republic of Cyprii.s:
The mediation efforts resulted in the Zurich, London and Guarantee 
Agreements*’ that were based on bi-national independency, political equality and 
administrative partnership of the two communities, full authority in communal 
affairs, and guarantee of Turkey, Greece and Britain^. The agreements prohibit 
Cyprus' annexation by or union with any other country.
The agreements were signed by Turkey, Greece and Britain. According to 
some scholars, the agreements and the Constitution o f the Republic of Cyprus were
Obcrlina,
imposed on the communities by great powers and that was the main reason of its 
failure”. During the deliberations for the agreements, the nation of Cyprus did not 
exist and it was hoped that it would eventually emerge after the establishment of the 
republic. In 1960, the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus was seen as a miracle^ 
and a big success o f the mediators.
Nevertheless, the Constitution of the Republic o f Cyprus was based on 
communal dualism'” and it legalized the de facto partition of both communities 
instead of bringing them together. The Constitution included the right to celebrate 
respectively Greek and Turkish national days and to use the flag o f Turkey and 
Greece". The Turkish side, that always supported TAKSİM policy, was satisfied 
with the dualistic character of the Constitution and the rights granted to them. The 
populalion ratio of the Turkish Cypriots to Greek Cypriots was 20:80. Nevertheless, 
according to the Constitution, the public service and police force would be 
composed of 70% Greeks and 30% Turks. In addition, the ratio in the army would
he 40:60'7
The most important factor was the establishment of separate Community 
Parliaments that would consist of representatives o f each cominunity'”. It was 
obvious that this was unacceptable for the Greeks and they initiated the well-known 
13-amendmcnts of President Makarios on November 30, 1963, that included, among 
other things, abolition of the separate majority votes in the parliament, establishment *
For full texts of the agreements see Ertekiin, 145.
’ Ertekfm, 7.
* Maria Hadjipavlov-Trigeorgis and Leños Trigeorgis, "An Evolutionary Approach to Conflict 
Resolution," .lournal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. .37 No. 2, June 1993, 340-360.
’’ Erlekiin, 8.
Joseph vS. .To,seph, 21.
" Ibid. 21.
Ibid. 23.
of uiiilled municipalities, unification o f tlie administration of justice and participation 
of tlie communities in public service in proportion to population''’. His argument was 
to create a unitary state and to eliminate the polarization within the Republic. But 
they were also sure that these amendments would not be accepted by Turkish 
Cypi iots. Years later, when the Greek newspaper, Patris, published the Akritas Plan, 
the international community learned the reason behind this proposal of amendments. 
The plan was di awn up in 1963 with the help of Greece'''. According to the Akritas 
Plan'’’, President Makarios would propose amendments to the Constitution of 1960 
and it was expected that the Turkish Cypriots would reject the amendments. Thus, 
the Greek Cypriots would pass to the next step of the Akritas Plan'’: The Turkish 
Cypriots would be eliminated within 24 hours and it would be resulted with the 
achievement o f ENOSIS. On 21 December 1963, the armed onslaught against the 
1’uikish Cypriots started'". Nevertheless, the. Turkish defense could not be broken 
within 24 houis. Due to the lack of international reaction, Turkey sent her warplanes 
and attacked some of the Greek troops with her legal right that was given her with 
the Treaty o f Guarantee. It resulted with the end o f massacres. At that time, 
N4akarios himself declared that "the Constitution of 1960 is dead and buried""’. The 
Turkish C3'priots were forced to live within enclaves that made up 3% o f the island.
In 1964, the UN Peace-Keeping Force was sent to the island but proved to be 
ineffective in keeping peace.
" Ahmet An, Kibnslilik Bilincinin Gclislirilincsi. (Tlie Development of a Cypriot 
Con.sciou.sness), (Lefkoşa: Galeri Kültür Yayınları. 1998), 12.
.loseph S. .lo.seph, 28. 
nitekim, 10.
For İnil te.Nt of (he Akrilas Plan see Sabahattin İsmail, I,*)!) Somda Kıbrıs Sonınıı. (The 
Cyprus Problem in l.'îO Questions). (İstanbul: Kasta.ş Yayınevi, 1998). 72-86.
” Pierre Oberling, "Cv/m«. Yesterday and Today," public lecture given at the University of 
Texas at Austin on March 7, 199.“).
"'Frtekiin, 10.
At (he end of 1967, the attacks against the Turkisli Cypriots started again. The 
tlireat o f intervention from Turkey put an end to tlie attack against tlie Turkish 
community.
Makarios was aware that he could not acliieve ENOSIS by military means 
because of 7'urkey's reactions and he changed his policy. An economic embargo was 
imposed on Turkish Cypriots and they were deprived of all their governmental and 
political rights that were granted them with the Constitution of 1960. It was this 
change of policy that caused the 1974 Coup against Makarios that was organized by 
Greece. The military junta of Greece was not satisfied with Makarios' policy of 
achieving FiNOSIS in the long run. Instead, the junta wanted to annex Cyprus to 
Greece as soon as possible and i?i order to achieve it, first, they had to leave out 
Makai ios. In .luly 1974, the Greek forces and Greek military staff in Cyprus staged a 
bloody coup against Makarios and brought a puppet regime o f the junta^” under the 
presidency o f Nicos Sampson that was a well known person who had killed 
numerous Turkish Cypriots during the massacres. The new regime would achieve 
ENOSIS iiTimediately after the coup. Nevertheless, the junta leaders forgot one vital 
factor (hat would cost them very high. Turkey's reaction was very fierce. She 
initiated the 'Peace Operation' on 20 July 1974"'.
1.3. The Peace Operation:
The Peace Operation was a military success for Turkey. Turkey's intervention 
was justified by the Treaty of Guarantee as any attempt to annex Cyprus to any other 
coundy would give right of intervention to guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey or
Pierre Olicrling, "Cyprus, Yesterday and Today," pulilic lecture given at tlie University of 
Texas at Austin on Marcli 7, 1995.
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Brilain) to protect tlie integrity and independence of Cyprus. According to Turkey, 
the military coup was an attempt to annex. Cyprus to Greece and, hence, it was her 
legal right and obligation to intervene in Cyprus. Correspondingly, Nicos Sampson 
him.self. President of Cyprus for eight days after the coup, declared in the Greek 
newspaper, Makhi, that "I was about to proclaim ENOSIS when I quit"^ .^ When the 
negotiations that took place in two Geneva Conferences failed, Turkey undertook 
the Second Peace Operation and reached the boundaries (37% of total area of 
Cyprus) that would be the borders of the Turkish Republic o f Northern Cyprus in 
future.
/. 4. Jntercommwial Talks:
After the end of the war" ,^ negotiations took place in Vienna. In the third round 
of the talks (31 July - 2 August 1975) the question of transfer of population was 
settled. The Turkish Cypriots living in the south moved to the north o f the island, 
whereas Greek Cypriots living in the northern side o f the island (that went under the 
control of Turkish army after the war) moved to the south. Thus, homogeneity of 
the populations has been achieved.
On 13 February 1975, the Turkish Cypriot community established the Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus. Instead of seeking recognition, the aim of the Turkish 
community was to keep an open door if the Greek Cypriots decided to create a 
similar federated state in the south and form a Federal State.
.’ 0 Joseph .S. Joseph, 3.
Eirlekiin, 32.
Ibi(l.33.
■' there is no legal cease fire agreement between the two sides yet, after 24 years of the Peace 
Operation.
II
April 1975 was (he dale of commencement of (he intercommiiiial talks under 
the auspices of the UN Secretary-General. The talks resulted with a set of principles 
that has been agreed by Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Denkta§. These Four 
Guidelines are as follows:
1- We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, federal Republic.
2- The territories under the administration of each community should be discussed in 
the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.
3- Problems like freedom of movement, freedom o f settlement, the right o f property 
and other specific issues are open for discussion. During discussions, the principles 
of bicommunal federal system and certain difficulties, which may arise for the 
'riirkish Cypriot community, should be taken into consideration.
4- The powers and functions of federal government will be such as to safeguard the 
unity and bicommunal character of the Slate '^*.
After the death of Makarios, the new leader of the Greek Cypriots, Mr. 
Kypi ianou, and Mr. Denkta§ met in Nicosia under the chairmanship o f  the Secretary- 
General and agreed on a new set of principles, which is called the Ten-Point 
Agreement. These ten points are as follows:
1- The intercommunal talks will start on June 15, 1979.
2- The basis for the talks will be the Makarios / Denkta? guidelines and the UN  
resolutions on Cyprus question.
3- There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of 
Cyprus.
4- 'flic talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional matters.
II. Dodd, The Political. Social and Economic Development of Northern Cvpi iis. 
(Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1993), 18.
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5- As soon as an agreement on Varoslia has been reached, it will be implemented 
without awaiting any agreement on any other aspects of the Cyprus question.
6- It was agreed to abstain from any action which may negatively influence the 
outcome of the talks and special importance will be given respectively to initial 
practical measures to promote good will, mutual confidence and return to normal 
conditions.
7- The Republic of Cyprus will be demilitarized.
8- The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the 
Republic should be guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other 
country and against any form of partition or secession.
9- The intercommunal talks will continue in a continuing and sustained manner, 
avoiding atiy delay.
10- The intercommunal talks will take place in Nicosia^'\
Nevertheless, intercommunal talks could not be resumed on June 15, 1979 as 
foreseen in the first point of the Ten-Point Agreement. The Greek Cypriot side was 
insisting on the discu.ssion of the future o f Varosha^*’. In fact, the inability to resume 
the talks was, more or less, the result of different perceptions o f both sides against 
each other. The Greek Cypriots accepted Turkish Cypriots as a minority. As the only 
sovereign and internationally recognized side o f the Cyprus problem, the Greek side 
tended to see intercommunal relations in terms of a majority-minority relationship^’. 
On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots did not see themselves as a minority but as 
one o f the two communities that should own equal rights with the Greeks. In 
addition to this, it was only after the Peace Operation that the Turkish Cypriots
Ibid. 19.
Obcrliiig, The Road (o llcllapais, 216
1.1
began to feel secure after long years of fear and threats coming from tlie Greek side. 
Under these circumstances, ‘...finding an appropriate form for negotiations was a 
major difficulty, since it turned upon the status of the parties to the dispute...’"*. 
Nevertheless, intereommunal talks resumed on 9 August 1980 under the auspiees of 
Ambassador Hugo .luan Gobbi, the Special Representative of the U. N. Secretary- 
General.
Starting from that date, consecutive rounds o f intercommunal talks dealt with 
the following four subjects:
1- Reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under U. N. auspices.
2- Initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and 
the return to normal conditions.
3- Constitutional a.spects.
4- Tei ritorial aspects"’.
On 5 August 1981, the Turkish Cypriot side proposed a comprehensive 
settlement that foiesaw ‘a draft constitution and territorial proposals which included 
Varosha^"’. The proposal was found unacceptable by the Greek community.
1.5. The Turkish Republie of Northern Cyprus:
On 17 June 1983, the Parliament of Turkish Federated State of Cyprus decided 
to use the right o f self-determination. On 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriot 
community used the mentioned right and announced the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic o f Northern Cyprus (T.R.N.C.) This action was condemned by the
C. II. Dodd, 19. 
Ibid. 21.
F.rickiin, 107.
R. R. Dcnklnsh, I’he Cvonrs Triangle, (London: K. Rustem & Brotlier, 1988), 112. 
Siibnliatlin İsmail. 176.
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Scciirily Council. Tlic Council clcclarccl that ‘llic purported secession of part of the 
Republic of Cyinus...was invalid’ '^. On the other iiand, by announcement of the 
eslablislimeiit o f the T.R.N.C., the Turkish Cypriot side did not close the door 
towards bi-communal, bi-zonal federal solution. In accordanee, the Turkish Cypriot 
side accepted the UN Secretary- General's call for separate meetings with the two 
sides. The first round took place in Vienna and the Secretary-General presented a set 
of "working points" to both sides which included a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation 
in accordance with the Summit Agreements of 1977 and 1979. As a result of these 
discussions, the Secretary-General prepared a document o f 27 November 1984 
called "the Draft Agreement on Cyprus". The document was accepted by the Turkish 
Cypriots but was rejected by the Greek Cypriot side^ .^
On 15 September 1988, under the auspiees o f the Secretary-General, Mr. 
Vassiliou and Mr. Denkta§ met at the Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia. At the end o f  
the three rounds of talks, they decided to hold a summit meeting between 26 
Fcbruary-2 March 1990 in New York^“'.
Before his departure to New York, Denkta? prepared the Turkish side’s 
proposal. During the negotiations that started on 26 February 1990, the Turkish 
Cypriot delegate presented their proposal to the Greek Cypriots and the Greek side 
refused it^\ The proposal argued ‘that the Turkish Cypriots are two distinct and 
separate peoples with a right to freely determine their political status’ *^* which caused 
the reaction o f Mr. Perez de Cuellar.
C. II. Dodd, 25.
Available on (he inlernet on
liI(p;/Av\vw.mra.gov.(r/GRUPF/defaiill.asp?Param=/gnipf/Back.htm 
”  Ibid. 29.
"  SabahaUin Ismail. 205.
C. II. Dodd, 29.
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The Greek Cypriot application for full membership in the EC caused protests 
from the Turkish Cypriot side and brought negotiated settlement to the edge of 
collapse.
1.6. Set of Idea.s:
In 1992, the new Secretary-General o f the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
proposed a “Set o f Ideas” that would form the basis of a negotiated settlement. In 
the proposal, there was a map that foresaw the transfer o f the control o f Morphou to 
the Greek Cypriots as the only land transfer. The most vital points o f the Set of 
Ideas are as follows:
1- The establishment o f a federal republic that would ensure equal political rights to 
both o f the communities. Nevertheless, political equality does not mean numerical 
equality within government organs.
2- Each federated state will be administered by one community.
3- Each federated state will decide on its own governmental arrangement in a 
manner consistent with the federal constitution.
4- The ratio o f federal officials and civil servants will be 70:30 Greek 
Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot ratio.
5- The legislature will be composed of a lower house and an upper house.
6- The presidents o f the lower house and of the upper house cannot come from the 
same community.
7- The lower house will be bi-coinmunal with a 70:30 Greek Cypriot/Turkish 
Cypriot ratio.
8- The upper house will have 50:50 ratio.
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9- Tlierc will lie a council o f ministers composed o f Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot ministers on a 7:3 ratio.
10- The freedom of movement will be exercised without any restrictions as soon as 
the federal republic is established.
11- The freedom of settlement and the right to property will be implemented after 
the resettlement process arising from the territorial adjustments has been 
completed^*'.
The Set of Ideas had also included a map that divides the island as 28.2% of the 
total area belonging to the Turkish Cypriots. According to the map, the Turkish 
Cypriots would transfer 37 Turkish villages (including Morphou) to the Greek 
community. It also requested the establishment of a Greek canton in the 
Rizokarpasso peninsula. Mr. Denkta§ rejected this map and announced that he could 
only decrease to 29% and Morphou has to be included within the territories of 
Turkish Cypriots The Greek Cypriot side stated that it accepted the Set o f Ideas 
as a basis for reaching a framework agreement but subject to negotiation.
In the 1993 elections in Southern Cyprus, the government changed and Mr. 
Clerides came to power instead of Mr. Vassiliou. Mr. derides announced that he 
was against the Set of Ideas of Ghali. The main reason of this change o f policy was 
the new government’s reliance on the rightist votes within the Greek Cypriot 
community'”. Mr. Clerides argued that ‘priority should be given to the entry of 
Cyprus into the European Community...and the solution to the Cyprus problem had
' Ibid. 32-36.
Sabah,'İllin İsmail. 234.
' Clement II. Dodd, Kıbrıs Meselesi: Güncel Bir Bakış, (Ankara: Tıırhan Kilabevi, 1996), 12.
17
lo he based on Ihe principles of the EC, and that the Seeretary-General’s Set of 
Ideas had to be revised in that direction’'".
1.7.Confidence Building Mea.mres:
In order to find an exit to the deadlock, the U.N. Secretary-General prepared 
and presented Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in July 1993. The most 
important points of the CBMs are the following:
1- The cooperation of experts on the issue of the water problem in order to increase 
the supply o f water.
2- The cooperation o f experts on the issue of education in order to develop 
intecommunal harmony and friendship.
3 - InternationaI aid will be benefited by both sides on just basis.
4 - Varosha will be under the administration of the U.N. until a comprehensive 
agreement has been reached and the properties in Varosha will be returned to their 
owners.
5- The Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can enter into Varosha without any 
restriction. They can use the area for trade purposes.
6- Nicosia International Airport will be under the administration and control o f the 
U.N. and ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) and it will be open to 
civil passenger and cargo traffic. Foreign visitors who had entered from International 
Nicosia Airport could travel between both sides without any restriction''^.
The CBMs included some positive elements that could be helpful towards 
reaching an agreement on the Cyprus question. Nevertheless, it iiad many
C. II. Dodd, The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, 40. 
Sabahattin İsmail. 255-258.
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insiiniciencics, siicli as the transfer of tourists from South Cyprus to Varosha which 
was surrounded by tlie T.R.N.C. territories and the sea, tliat could cause many 
problems in practice. Correspondingly, the negotiations were held in order to 
overcome these insufnciencies. During tlie negotiations the Turkisli Cypriot and 
Greek Cypriot sides accepted many concessions that liighlighted tlie hopes'* .^
Nevertheless, the decision o f the Court o f Justice on 5 July 1994 which forbids 
North Cyprus’ export of potato and citrus changed the whole climate and the 
Turkish Cypriot side, to protest the decision, announced that it would not continue 
the negotiations. In addition, the parliament of the T.R.N.C. announced that “as long 
as the decision taken by the Court o f Justice continues to be in force and the Greek 
Cypriot side continues its efforts to join the E.U.'’“’, there will be no benefit in 
continuing negotiations on the CBMs”''·^ .
Interestingly, in November 1994, Mr. derides and Mr. Denkta? had five 
unofficial meeting under the auspices of U.N. representative Gustave Feissal but 
these negotiations didn’t bring any positive outcome.
On 20 January 1995, Mr. Denkta? presented his proposal. Peace Plan, which 
consisted o f 14 points. It revealed the Turkish Cypriot side’s perception“'^ ’. The 
document stressed Turkish side’s the idea o f a bi-communal, bi-zonal and federal 
solution. With the proposal, the Turkish Cypriot side announced its readiness to 
implement CBMs and to begin talks without preconditions. The proposal also 
stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is ready to discuss the subject of EU 
membership of the federal Republic after the conclusion o f an agreement. The Greek 
Cypriot side rejected the proposal.
Clement H. Dodd. Kıbrıs Meselesi: Güncel Bir Bakış. 18.
the effects of the E.U. on the Cyprus problem will be discırssed more detailed later.
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l.S.The I f^f'ecls of the EU on the Cyprus Problem:
On 19 December 1972, the Republic of Cyprus signed an association 
agi eement witli the EEC that provided the elimination of trade barriers between the 
EEC and Cyprus. In 1990, South Cyprus, internationally recognized as the Republic 
of Cyprus, applied for full membership to the EC. Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriots 
applied for membership on behalf o f the entire island and this caused the protest of 
the Turkish Cypriot side on the basis that the Republic o f Cyprus does not have the 
right to speak for the whole o f Cyprus'’^ . Also they argued that, according to the 
1960 Agieements, each community has a veto power in issues such as membership 
in international organizations. On 30 June 1993, the European Commission 
concluded that ‘the Community considers Cyprus as eligible for membership and as 
soon as the prospect of a settlement is surer, the Community is ready to start the 
process with Cyprus that should eventually lead to its accession’“'*.
In June 1995, the European Council announced ‘that negotiations on the 
accession o f Malta and Cyprus to the Union will begin on the basis o f commission 
proposals, six months after the conclusion o f the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference and taking the outcome of that conference into account’''^ .
On 12 December 1997, in the Luxembourg summit, the EU decided to start 
the negotiations for the full membership of the Greek Cypriots as the Republic of 
Cyprus. The negotiations started at the end of March 1998 for the membership in the 
EU. As a countermeasure, the T.R.N.C parliament decided that intercommunal talks
■ Clement II. Dodd, 19. 
Ibid. 22.
.Io.sepli II. .Io.sepli, 117. 
''"ibid. 118.
''"ibid. 119.
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can take place t)ii (lie basis of two stales anti any agreement that could be reached 
must liavc the structure of an agreement between two slates^”.
According to the Turkish Cypriots, the involvement of the EU in the Cyprus 
problem always complicates the issue and it is not in a position to make a positive 
contribution to the resolution of the Cyprus question. On the other hand, according 
to the Gieek Cypriots, the EU ‘...is in a unique position to play a role in bringing 
about permanent peace and stability on the island’*” .
1.9.Recent Developments in Cyprus Conflict:
On December 4, 1995, US Presidential Envoy, Mr. Richard Beattie and the US 
Special Cyprus Coordinator, James Williams came to Cyprus to explore the ways 
that would enable the beginning o f new talks between Mr. Denki a§ and Mr. Clerides. 
On December 6, Mr. Denkta§ presented an offer which was prepared with the help 
of Richard Beattie. However, Mr. Clerides rejected the proposal with the argument 
(hat there was no common basis for negotiations.
Mr. Beattie revised the proposal and piesented it to Mr. Clerides during his 
visit. The Greek Cypriot National Council unanimously rejected the proposal.
On December 28, 1995, Mr. Denkta§ and Mr. Demirel signed a joint 
declaration. In declaration Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey announced their 
commitment to bi-communal, bi-zonal federal settlement based on the sovereign 
equality o f the both communities.
Sahaliatliii fsinail. F.gcineiilik. Aviuiia Birliği ve K.K.T.C., (.Sovereignty, tlie European 
Union and T.R.N.C.), (Nicosia:Ministry ofEoreign Affairs and Defence, Information 
Office, 1998), 3.
' .lo.seph II. Joseph, 126.
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On April 17, 1996, the representatives of 5 member states of the Security 
Council met in New York and announced their support to the US initiative in order 
to solve the Cyprus conflict.
On April 25, 1996, the US Assistant Secretary of State, John Kornblum and 
the Onice Director for Southern Europe, Carey Cavanaugh, visited the island to 
explore the way to resume negotiations.
On June 25, 1996, Professor Han Sun-Joo, the UN Secretary-General's 
Representative for Cyprus, arrived at the island and had talks with Mr. Denkta§ and 
Mr. derides. After the meetings, he announced that there was a sizeable gap 
between the positions of the two sides. Despite all these efforts, Mr. derides refused 
to enter into negotiations with the argument that there was no common ground for 
direct dialogue.
Between September 1996 and January 1997, Professor Han Sun-Joo visited 
the island three times. He proposed a joint declaration o f the two leaders of both 
coinmunities in order to ease the tension. It is accepted by Mr. Denkta§ but refused 
by Mr. derides.
On November 13, 1996, Mr. Carey Cavanaugh came to the island and 
exchanged view with both leaders. In addition to all these efforts, on 15 December 
1996, the British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind came to Cyprus and had 
meetings with Mr. derides and Mr. Denkta§ to be able to resume the talks. 
Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriot side continued its refusals on the ground that no 
common ground existed for negotiations'^^.
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2.CHAPTER II:
TI IE REARMAMENT OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS SINCE 1974
Un(il tlie Peace Operation o f Turkey in 1974, the Greek Cypriots were the 
more powerful and more advantageous side inside the island. They were the de facto 
rulers and militarily they had the superiority that enabled them to manipulate the 
Turkish side by force.
Willi the Peace Operation on July 1974, the balance o f power turned upside 
down. Till key's military victory, her entrance into the island with thousands of 
soldiers and the defeat of the Greek junta changed the existing balance within the 
island to the advantage o f the Turkish side. This new balance still continues today.
When we look at the Cyprus theatre, it is easy to see the relative superiority of 
the Turkish side. According to the World Defence Almanac 1997-1998', the total 
active manpower of the internationally recognized Republic o f Cyprus (Southern 
Cyprus) is 10,000, whereas the Turkish army in the North consists o f about 30,000 
men. When we look at the equipment of both sides, the superiority of the Turkish 
side can be seen again. The Greek Cypriot side has 95 main battle tanks (41 T-80Us 
and 54 AMX-30B2s); on the other hand, the Turkish side has 260 MBTs (all 
M48A5). According to the Military Balance 1997/1998, the Turkish side also has 50 
AAPC (Advanced Armour Personnel Carrier) and APC (Armoured Personnel
52Available on the internet on hltp:www.nifa.gov.li7GRUPF/ekl .htm
The Military Technology. The World Defence Almanac 1997-98 (Bonn: Mönch Publi.shing 
Group, 1998), 67-68.
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Carrier), 90 105 mni, 36 155 mm, 8 203 mm towed artillery, 102 107 mm, 30 120 
mm, 175 81 mm mortars, 38 TOW Anti-Tank Guided Weapons, surface-to-suiTace 
missiles (Stringer), 5 aircraft and 3-4 helicopters. On the other hand, the Greek 
Cypriot side also has 70 Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle (AIFV), 402 APC, 4 
75mm, 24 88mm, 10 100mm, 72 I05mm, 12 155mm towed artillery, 12 128 mm 
multiple rocket launcher (MRL), 250 81mm, 20 107mm, 116 120mm mortars, 3 
surface-lo-surface missiles (MM-40 Exocet), 117 Anti-Tank Guided Weapons 
(ATGW), 72 surface-to-air missiles (Mistral and Aspide), 9 helicopters^.
As can be seen from the numbers above, there is no big gap in terms of 
equipment in the Cyprus theatre, except for MBTs, APCs and ATGWs. 
Nevertheless, in terms of the numbers o f the total armed forces, the big gap between 
the two sides (the difference between the two armies is nearly 25,000) causes big 
debates among the Greek Cypriot community. In addition to this difference, the 
proximity of Turkey and its superiority in terms o f the air force makes many Greek 
Cypriots (including the policy makers) feel threatened and subject to Turkish 
dominance. According to Aristos Aristotelous\ the Greek Cypriots believe that 
“...in terms of numbers it is much higher than what should be needed for defending 
that part (North Cyprus) o f the island. And also because o f Turkish proximity, even 
if the army was smaller, they (Greek Cypriots) would still feel frightened”. Mr. 
Aristotelous also adds that “...w e made several surveys asking the people what they 
think the objective of Turkey is in Cyprus and we learnt that they believe that the 
objective o f Turkey is to capture the whole of the island and most of them feel 
friglUened by the presence of the Turkish army in C3'prus”. Accordingly, when we
’ Tlie Intcrnalional Institute For Strategic Studies. The Mililaiy Balance 1997-98 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 80-81.
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look at (lie statistics in the hook of Mr. Aristotelous“*, we can see that 83% of the 
Greek Cypriots, in 1987, felt threatened by (he Turkish military presence in Cyprus. 
Nevertheless, this pereentage deereased to 78% in 1988 and to 74% in 1992. The 
reason of this decrease can be the drastic increase in the defence expenditures of the 
internationally recognized government of Cyprus (South Cyprus) starting from 
I988 \ According to Mr. Aristotelous, the reason of this drastic increa.se was the 
Greek Cypriots’ feeling of insecurity resulting from their lack of effective and 
powerful defence. Mr. Aristotelous argues that “...by this thought, the Greek 
(,'ypriot side wants to have something to protect itself and to counter this possible 
threat (the threat of the Turkish army to capture the whole o f (he island) and this is 
also the story of the missiles, S-300s”.
Whatever the real motive behind the rearmament efforts of the Greek Cypriots 
is, (hey continued to rearm and spend huge amounts of their G.D.P. for defence 
expenditures starting from 1974. These efforts gained a momentum and a new phase 
with the election of Vassiliii in 1988. Because of this, I will divide the history of the 
rearmament of the Greek Cypriots into 2 periods as ‘Before 1988’ and ‘After 1988’:
l.J.The Rearmament Before 1988:
Just after the 1974 War, the biggest perceived threat for the Greek 
Cypriots was Greece. Thus, their main aim was to bring internal defence to such a 
level that a possible coup would be prevented^’. Nevertheless, these efforts have been
’ Ari.slos Ari.stolelou.s. Fnlerview with (he author. Nicosia, South Cyprus. November 13, 1998.
'' Aristos Aristotelous, The Military Balance, l995-l996:Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. (Nicosia, 
Cyprus Center For Strategic Studies, 1995), 91.
 ^ Ibid. 62.
"Akel Wants Militia Forces." Ilaravgi (March 4, I975).('l'he important news of the Greek 
Cypriot newspapers are translated into Turkish by Turkish News - Cyprus (Türk Ajansı -
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judged inadeqiialc by the many of tlie Greek Cypriots, espeeially against the 
perceived 'riirkish expansionism. On the other hand, they tend tc· wait and hope for a 
political solution for the Cyprus conflict before concentrating on armament to 
protect them against the Turks. In addition to this, the Greek Cypriots relied on the 
US embargo that was impo.sed against Turkey after the Peace Operation. For the 
Greek Cypriots, the US embargo was a guarantee against Turkish expansionism and, 
as long as the embargo continues to exist, the Greek Cypriot felt relatively secure.
Few years after the coup, readers started to read some sentences in the 
newspapers about “the reliance on Greece for the security of Cyprus”. It was 
obvious that the Greek Cypriots forgot the bad memories of the coup and began to 
rely on their motherland for the defence of Cyprus. Because o f this, instead of 
making efforts for their own armament, the Greek Cypriots (in the beginning) 
preferred to watch closely and be proud of the armaments efforts of Greece’. 
According to the Simerini newspaper*’, dated 19 June 1977, Greece had granted a 
guarantee for the Greek Cypriots to defeat any attack against Cyprus Helenism. 
According to Simerini, Cyprus is included within the Greek defence strategy. On the 
other hand, especially with the lift o f the embargo in 1978, which was imposed on 
Turkey by the US after the 1974 War, the criticisms about the inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness of the Greek Cypriot army began to ri.se. These critics accused the 
governments o f giving no importance to the defence and armament o f the island 
against increasing Turkish threat. *
Kıbrıs). The quotations from tlie.se newspapers are taken from these publications known as the 
Greek Cypriot Press Abstracts and, thus, can be subject to the translator’s subjectivity.
’ "Greece’s RcanmmeiU." (.September 16, 1975). And “Greek Cyprus' Rcannamcnt." 
niefthertis, (March 29, 1976).
* "Our Defense Jins Been Strengthened:' Simerini (,Iune 20, 1977).
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On 15 October 1981, the Simerini newspaper gave an inrorniation about the 
military strength oT tlie Greek Cypriots. Tlie numbers were taken from the 1981 
Yearbook of International Institute of Stiategie Reseaieh:
Total Arineci Forces: 8,000 
Main Battle 'I’anks; 10 (T-34)
Armoured Personnel Carriers: 17 (BFR)
Armoured Vehicle: 20 (Marrnoii Haiiington)
Mortars: 20
In the light ofthe.se numbers, the newspaper comments that the Greek Cypriots’ 
military equipment is in a very bad condition. According to Simerini, “the Greek 
Cypriot army is using the tanks and equipment which had been used during the 
Second World War”’. As a reaction to this comment on Simerini, Mevsimvrini 
announced on 28 October 1981 that the Greek army is more prepared relative to the 
information given by the International Institute for Strategic Studies'". The 
newspaper also supports that the efforts of rearmament are kept secret because of 
security reasons and the Greek army is more prepared and powerful than 1974.
During the 70s and early 80s, it was normal to keep the efforts of rearmament 
secret probably because of the perceived danger of the capture o f the whole island
by the Turkish army.
According to Mr. Aristotelous, in spite of their rearmament efforts, the balance 
within the island is in favour of the Turkish side. He also informs the Greek Cypriot 
public about the military strength of theii aimy.
0 Greek Cypriot Army’s Military Equipment is in a Very Bad Condition." .Simerini (October 
16, 1981).
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Armoured Vehicles: 20 (EE-9 Cascavel)
MBTs: 10(T-34)
APCs: 17(BTR-50)
Missiles: MILAN
Artillery: 120 (100 mm, 105 mm and 75 mm)
25 Pounder Guns 
40mm HOW and 106 mm Zastava 
Total Armed Forces:
1982:10,000 
1981: 8,000 
1980: 9,000 
Reserves:
1982: 30,000 
1981: 37,000 
1980: 21,000"
Under the light o f these statistics, Mr. Aristotelous comments on the military 
strength o f the Greek Cypriots and compares both sides. He argues that the models 
of the MBTs of the Greek Cypriot side (T-34) are outmoded and are powerless 
against the M-47 and M-48 tanks of the Turks. According to Mr. Aristotelous, the 
APCs owned by the Greek Cypriots are too old. The ratio of armoured vehicles 
between the Turkish side and the Greek side is 15: l'^ which can be the cleat- 
evidence of the gap between the two sides in 1982.
“M(vn< Things Have Been Done for Our Security Since 1974." Mevsimvrini (October 28, 
1981). '
" "We Reached to the Equilibrium Within the island hut the lurks are Still Superior." 
I'ilelcrthero.s (October 25, 1982).
Ibid. 6.
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On İliç oilier lıaiKİ, (he rlicloric of Hie Minisler of Internal Affairs and Defense 
Hristodiilos Benjamin can be the result o f their success in secret rearmament. On 20 
December 1982 in Dimokratiki new.spaper'\ he supported that “...another attack and 
progress o f Turkey in Cyprus will not be simple, easy and painless for themselves. 
Another attack won’t be a wandering for the Turks...”.
According to Enimerosi Journal that was published on 15 October 1983, the 
Greek Cypriot government purchased MBTs'“*. These tanks were more developed 
than T-34s and Marmour Harringtons that were previously owned by the Greeks.
On I January 1984, the Council o f Ministers in South Cyprus decided to 
establish (he Defense Contribution Fund. According to the decision, 0.5% of the 
salaries o f all the working population would be transferred to the Fund to be able to 
compensate the increasing defense exp en d itu resIn  the beginning o f the year 1985 
the government proposed the increase the deductions o f all the working population 
to (he Defen.se Contribution Fund to 1% but it was rejected by the majority of the 
Parliament
Between 1982-1985, the Greek Cypriot side purcha.sed numerous equipment 
and these purchases increased the ability of the Greek Cypriot army dramatically'^ 
According to the Simerini, within that period o f time, the Greek side purchased 120 
EE-9 Cascavel armoured vehicle from Brazil. Also, that was complemented with the 
purchase o f 18 VAB-VCI type and 66 VAB-VTT type APCs. In addition to these 
new purchases, the Greek Cypriots had this equipment and forces in 1985:
' ' "'Benjamin: Possible Tnrbish Attack won’t he a Wandering.” Dimokiatiki (December 20 
1982).
"Greek Cypriot Army’s Weapons Have Been Introduced.” Enimerosi (Oclober I.S, 1983)
' "Defense Donation Will Include AH Compatriots.” Agon, (February 17, 1984).
’ "Majority Blocked the !ncrea.se in the Percentage of the Contribution to the Defen.se.” TA 
Nca (.lamiary 1.5, 198.5).
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A'I’GW: 97 mm anti-tank weapons and AS-7 type surface-to-air missiles 
Airforce; 12 L-21A type aircraft and 2 AB-47G and FH-1100 type helicopters 
Total Armed Forces: 10,000 
Reserves: 60-70,000
According to the newspaper, the Turkish army in the North had this equipment 
and armed force:
MBTs: 150 M-47, M-48 and 5 T-34 
APCs: 133
Mortars: 212 105 mm and 155 mm 
HOW type 203 mm 
50 81 mm and 120 mm 
Total Armed Forces; 24,000
Again, at the end of 1985, the government proposed to increase the deductions 
to the Defense Contribution Fund from 0.5% to 3% in order to compensate huge 
military expenditures'*. Nevertheless, as the result of an objection of the leftist 
parlies inside the Parliament, the government could only manage to increase that 
amount from 0.5% to 1%, instead of 3% on 30 January 1986'^.
According to the report of the Cyprus Center for Strategic Studies, the Greek 
Cypriot government had purchased 20 EE-3 Jararaca armoured vehicles in addition 
to their EE-9 Ca.scavels. The numbers o f the mortars increased from 130 to 164.
"The Power of the Greek Cyprus Anny has Developed.” Eleftherotipia, (November 14, 
1985).
"the Contribution to the Defense is Going to he Increased to Apo)'evmatini (December 
16, 1985).
"The Percentage of the Defence Contribution has been Doubled." Tlie Cyprus Weekly 
(.lainiary 3 1 -February 6, 1986).
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Also, wilhin 1986, the total luiniber of ai iiiecl forces increased from 10,000''’ to 
13,000.
On June 21, 1987, the Greek Cypriot government signed an agreement with a 
weapon producer in France to purchase equipment worth $250 million. According to 
the Filelcftheros newspaper, the list o f the purchased equipment is as follows:
-16 MBTs (AMX-30-E2 type)
-4 helicopters (BELL 20G and GAZELLE SA 342 LI types)
-hi-tech missiles (ИОТ-2 type)^'
The Greek Cypriot government justified these purchases with the reinforcement 
of the Turkish army with the new weapons and personnel in Northern Cyprus'^ 
They argued that, in Northern Cyprus, the amount of total armed forces increased 
from 30,000 to 34,000. Also, the MBTs have increased from 300 to 400 and have 
been modernized. In addition, they supported that the Turkish army had 3,000 
surface-to-surface missiles located on Beşparmak Mountains turned towards the 
South^\
To compensate the military expenditures o f 1987, which increased with the 
agreement of South Cyprus with France to buy MBTs, helicopters and missiles, the 
government increased the contribution of all the working population to the Defence 
Contribution Fund frorr. 1% to 2% on 29 October 1987^ '*. In 1987, another purchase 
was done by the Greek Cypriots. This time the supplier country was Greece. They 
bought APCs from that country. The model was LEONIDAS I ' \
“Greek Cypriot National Security Army.“ Cyprus Center for Strategic Studies report. 
“Cypru.s Ordered Bif! Amount of Weapon.'!.“ rWeleiiheros (h\\y 10, 1987).
Ibid. .“i.
“Atilla’s Power is Increasing." Alitliia (September 28, 1987).
“ ' “The Defence Contribution Has Been Increased." Ilaravgi (October 30, 1987).
“Swi.ss Aircrafts, French Rockets and Greek Tanks for the Greek Cypriot Army.” Epikeii 
(February 25, 1989).
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2.2. The Reannament Afler 1988:
February 1988 was the date of the election of Yeorgios Vasilliu as the new 
President of the Greek Cypriots^ .^ With his election, these efforts entered into new 
phase. After his election, the Greek Cypriots’ rearmament efforts became apparent. 
Instead of keeping weapon purchases secret, during the Vasilliu period, the Greek 
Cypriots had preferred to announce their purchases to the public regularly. 
Accordingly, the Defence Minister Stavros Angelidis announced, on November 2, 
1988, the preparation of two five-year plans aimed at the strengthening of the Greek 
Cypriot army. These plans consisted of two periods, between 1988-1992 and 1993- 
1997” .
At the beginning o f 1989, the Greek Cypriot government announced its 
purchase of 20 SAM 7 missiles'*. In addition to this, two weeks later, they informed 
the public about the purchase of HOT-2 and MISTRAL missiles which were 
assembled on Gazelle helicopters” . In February, they also ordered to buy 32 
armoured vehicles from Greece. Their aim was to buy LEONIDAS IIs, which were 
more developed and powerful models of LEONIDAS Is*'’.
In March, the government announced the purchase of French made surface-to- 
air Krotal missiles and Greek made anti-aircrafts (Artemis type)*'. On July 1989, 
Greece donated 36 AMX-30 type MBTs to the Greek Cypriots. Nevertheless, these
"Vasilliu is Chosen as the New President." Simerini (February 2, 1988).
"Two Five-year Plans Have Been Prepared for the Greek Cypriot Army." Fileleftheros 
(November 2, 1988).
■* "SAM 7 Missiles Have Been Bought for the Greek Cypriot National Security Army." Alithia 
(.Iamiary27, 1989).
"Mi.stral Missiles for the Greek Cypriot Army." Agon (February 11, 1989).
".Swi.ss Aircraft.s, French Rockets and Greek Tanks for the Greek Cypriot Army." Epikeri 
(February 2.5, 1989).
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tanks were being used by Greece since 1963 and they needed modernization . In 
August, the Greek Cypriot army look delivery of a Swiss made PC-9 aircraft. With 
llie agreement between the two contracting parties, the Greek Cypriots purchased 2 
PC-9s froin that country” . According to Simerini, the Greek Cypriot government 
ordered 36 AMX-30-B2 type MBTs to France. In addition to this, they also 
puicliased MISTRAL type anti-aircraft missiles from the same country *^*.
With the help of those various purchases of weapons by the Greek Cypriots, 
the President of South Cyprus Mr. Vassiliu said that “We are proud of the 
strengthening of our security. Until reaching a demilitarized Cyprus and a fair and 
permanent solution, we will continue our efforts to strengthen our defence...
On January 1990, the Greek Cypriots took the delivery of their second PC-9 
from Sweden^'’. This plane was named as “Famagusta” by the Greek Cypriots. In 
January, they would also order new weapons to France worth $100 million in 
accordance with their agreement with that country that was signed in 1987. The 
Defence News does not give the details, but according to , the Greek Cypriot 
newspapers, they purchased many anti-tank weapons from France^ .^ This new order 
was in accordance with the 3-year rearmament program and after the completion of 
this program, according to Fileleftheros, the Greek Cypriots would prepare another 
5-year rearmament program'^*. On January, the Greek Cypriots took the delivery of
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" “French Krolal Mis.siles and Greek Anti-aircrafts for the Greek Cypriot Army.” Alithia 
(Marcli 8, 1989).
’’ “The Parliament Approved .18 Million for the Modernization of 36 Tanks.” Alilliia (July 8, 
1989).
^^ "The Aircraft that has been Delivered to the Greek Cypriot Army is Called "Kyrenia".” TA 
Nea (August 31, 1989).
’’ “Greek Cypriot National Security Army is Purchasing 36 More French AMX-30-B2s.” 
Simerini (September 4, 1989).
“IVe Will Continue to the Strengthening of Our Defence.” Fileleftheros (October 2, 1989). 
"Second Aircraft Arrived.” Simerini (January 8, 1990).
”  Ibid. 4.
”  “.1-year Rearmament Program.” Fileleftheros (January 11, 1990).
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Ilicir ЛМХ-30-В2 type MBTs, wliich were ordered on September 1989, and started 
to use tliem within the ariny^ .^
These new purehases caused a deficit (86 million Cyprus Pounds) in the 
defence budget of the Greek Cypriots. As usual, to compensate for this deficit, the 
government proposed to increase the contribution to the Defence Contribution Fund 
to 4% from 2%'’*’. Nevertheless, this increase was again rejected by the Parliament. 
The Greek Cypriot Parliament decided to keep that amount at 2%. Instead of 
increasing this percentage to 4%, they decided to put 3% tax on interests, rents and 
C(mipany profits'". On March 1990, they also ordered new weapons to France that 
worth $100 million. The list o f the ordered weapons was as follows:
-155 mm MK-F artillery 
-12 armoured vehicles 
-AMX-13 type light tanks (LTk)
-120 mm Thomson-Brand type mortars
-1000 APILAS and Matra Manhurin type mobile anti-tank guns'*^
In May 1990, the Greek Cypriot newspapers announced that they would 
purchase this equipment for the Greek Cypriot army:
-2 helicopters (Gazelle type and equipped with HOT missiles)
-12 Anti-tank weapons (VAB type)
-12 VAB type vehicles (equipped with Mistral missiles)
-12 vehicle equipped with 155 mm artillery
.V ) 'New Tanks, New Weapons^ PROINA NEA (January 15, 1990).
40 Deficit in Defence Budget^ Alitliia (January 30, 1990).
41 'New Taxes for Reannament'' S'mtxm  (March 15,
'New Weapons Purchase from FranceT Eleftherotipia (March 12, 1990).
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-12 VAB (ype vehicles (equipped witli MOT missiles)
-medium-range anli-aircrafl missile system
In addition to these, the Greek Cypriot government signed an agreement to 
purchase 76 LEONIDAS II type Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) from 
Greece''^. On November 1990, the Parliament of the Greek Cypriots started to the 
discussions for the 1991 defence budget. According to the Minister of Defence and 
Minister of Finance, the defence budget would have a big deficit in the year 1991''“'. 
The situation got worse with increasing debts of the Defence Fund''\ Under these 
circumstances, in order to implement the new 3-year plan that was aimed at the 
rearmament of the Greek Cypriot army, the Greek Cypriot politicians started to talk 
about the increase in the deductions of the citizens to the Defence Contribution Fund
to 3% or 4%''^
Nevertheless, by 1991, the ideas had changed. Instead of increasing that rate to 
3% or 4%, the Greek Cypriot administration decided to keep it at 2%. In accordance 
with this decision, they agreed to decrease the defence expenditures. The defence 
expenditures for the period 1992-1994 would be half of the expenditures used 
between 1989-1991“'’ . Their argument was that they had filled the gaps in the 
defence area and there is no more need to keep the defence expenditures at that 
level“"*.
The main reason of this decrease in the defence expenditures of the Greek 
Cypriots was the changing climate within the area that was caused by the Gulf War. 
The economic hardships caused by the crisis of the Gulf War influenced the
"Purchose of New Equiputeut for the Greek Cypriot Army.” Mevsimviiiii (May I, 1990). 
' "Deficit in the Defence Budget.” Fileleftheros (November 6, 1990).
“Defence Matter.” Fileleflheros (November 18, 1990).
■ 16 ¡\/ijiii()i] j})i· Rearinanient.” Agon (December 20, 1990).
”  “The Defence Contrihntion won't he Increased.” Ilaravgi (January 5, 1991).
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economy of South Cyprus as of many countries in the area. As a result of this, the 
Greek Cypriots were forced to change their rearmament programs to be able to fit 
into the new climate'’'’. Accordingly, they postponed their weapon orders to 1992.
In November 1992, PROINA NEA new.spaper announced that the new defence 
strategy of the Greek Cypriot army is based on the mobility of the units with the help 
of LEONIDAS type APCs. In addition, they decided to broaden their defence area 
with the establishment of navy and air force^”.
1993 was the year of the election of Mr. derides as the President of the 
internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus. In March 1993, Mr. Vassiliu was 
replaced by him and with his election, the Greek Cypriots’ rearmament efforts 
entered, once more, into a new phase. The rearmament plan that was prepared by 
the Vassiliu administration had been examined by the derides administration 
because of the hardships in compensating for huge defence expenditures'^’. 
Accordingly, the new administration had started to consider increasing the duration 
of the 3-year rearmament plan to 5 years. In addition, in the name o f increasing the 
defence capabilities of the South Cyprus, instead of purchasing new weapons, 
derides administration would give special importance to the development and the 
training of their reserves'^ .^
On July 1993, the Selides journal gave information about the equipment of the 
Greek Cypriot army. According to the Journal, they had the following:
MBTs: 54 AMX-30-B2 type
Ibid. 4.
"New Rearnumieni Progrants." Fileleflheius (February 3, 1991).
“Navy am! Air Force for the Greek Cypriot Army.'' PROINA NEA (November 7, 1992). 
"Rearmomeiit and Econoim." Agon (April 4, 1993).
.•Ϊ2 <."Meeting on Greek Cypriot Army." Filelefdieros (May !, 1993).
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APCs: Leonidas
Ai inoured Vehicles: 130 EE-9 Cascavel
18 EE-3 Jararaca
145 VAB-VCI/VI1/HOT
Aircral'ts: 2 PC 9
1 BN 2T Islander 
Helicopters: 4 Gazelle type 
3 AB 206 type 
Missiles: Aspide 
Mistral
Oerlikon GDF 003 53
Under these circumstances, the Joint Defence Doctrine between the Greek 
Cypriot government and Greece was signed in November 1993. This agreement was 
signed in order to protect Cyprus Helenism. According to the new doctrine:
1- The “Cyprus decides and Greece supports” doctrine will be abandoned and “the 
decisions are taken jointly” doctrine would be applied.
2- Cyprus would be included within the joint defence plan of Greece“'“’.
According to Mr. derides, “the Turkish army in Cyprus has been developed 
qualitatively and quantitatively and there is continuous danger against the people of 
Cyprus. We can’t sit and wait without doing anything against that threat. It was 
unavoidable for us to enter into the Greek defence area.”'’\  He also added that 
“There is an unbalance in terms of military power in Cyprus. As such, the Greek 
Cypriots will not be able to stand this unbalance any more. The new defence doctrine
"Weapons of the Greek Cypriot Army." Sclides (July 25, 1993). 
"New Doctrine has Been Finalized." Agon (November 17, 1993).
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is aimed at llie abolishment of this unhalance” *^’. Accordingly, Mr. Aristotelous 
informed (hat for every Greek Cypriot soldier, there were 3.2 Turkish soldiers inside 
the island. Also, for every Greek Cypriot tank, there were 6 Turkish tanks^’ .
The rearmament of the Greek Cypriot side would continue according to the 
‘joint defence’ principle of the new doctrine’*'. On the other hand, it has been 
announced that the 4-years’ rearmament program would continue without 
inlerruption’**.
In the middle of 1994, the Greek Cypriot administration decided to start the 
weapon purchases again that were stopped with the election o f derides in March 
1993. The justification of this interval in the rearmament was ‘change in the 
procedure of the weapon purchases’*’*’. Accordingly, in November 1994, it was 
announced that the Greek Cypriots had decided to buy TOMA type APCs from 
Russia. 3’he amount would probably be around 140. In addition, the Greek Cypriot 
administration was having consultations with the Russians in order to purchase T72- 
S type MBTs*” . In addition to this, it was announced that the other supplier of the 
Greek Cypriots’, Greece, was going to sell 200 Leonidas type APCs, Artemis type 
anti-aircrafts and 100 AMX-30 type French tanks to them*’^ .
On the other hand, it was announced that in the beginning of 1995, the Greek 
Cypriot government had decided to employ 2000 military personnel in the army to 
serve for 5 years . This personnel would use high technology armoured vehicles and
55 <
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The Reason of Joint Defence.'' Mahi (November 18, 1993). 
Tower Balances." Fileleflheros (November 19, 1993).
"Power Balance." vSimerini (November 29, 1993).
"Joint Air and Naval Maneuvers." vSiinerini (December 24, 1993).
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'Greek Cypriot Army's Rearmament Program." Eleftherotipia (February 4, 1994). 
'Weapon Purchases are Starting Again." Fileleftheros (July 12, 1994). 
"Rearmament is Continuing." Mahi (November 12, 1994).
Joint Rearmament." Fleflherotipia (December 28, 1994).
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weapon systems'’^ . In March, Agon announced the military strength of both sides. 
According lo the newspaper, the Greek Cypriot side and tlic Turkish Cypriot side 
had this equipment and military strength:
GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE:
MBT:52 AMX-30-B2 type
Armoured Vehicle: 120 EE-9 Cascavel (Reconnaissance Vehicle)
28 EE-3 Jararaca
27 VAB-VCI (Infantry Combat Vehicle)
APC: 17 BTR-5()P 
100 VAB-νΤ Γ  
32 Leonidas 
15 EE-11 Urartu 
Artillery: 148 total
4 75mm (M-116A1 PAK type)
54 76mm (M-42 type)
18 88mm (25 PUNTER type)
36 100mm (M -1944 type)
36 105mm (M -101 and M-56 types)
Multiple Rocket Launcher: 128mm M-63 YMRL-32 type 
Mortar: 81mm, 82mm, 100mm, 120mm 
Anti-tank Guided Weapons:
Milan missiles 
HOT missiles
Rocket Launchers: 450 89mm (M-20 type)
"Greek Cypriot Army." Simerini (.laiuiary I, 1993).
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Anli-aircraft Weapons: 155 total 
Surface-to-air missiles: 24 8Л-7
18 Mistral
Exocet missiles
Air-craft: 1 Islander type 
2 PC-9 type
Helicopter: 2 BELL 206 
2 MD-500
3 SA-342 Gazelle (with HOT missiles)
TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE:
МВТ: 300 (M-48 A5 types)
APC: 100 M -l 13 type 
100 M-59 type 
Artillery: 194 total
144 105mm 
36 155mm
8 203mm
9 155mm 
Mortar: 144 107mm
Anti-tank Weapons: 80 Cobra and TOW type 
Anti-aircraft: 84 40mm 
Aircraft: 8
40
Ilclicop lcr: 12'^ ’’
In June 1995, the Greek Cypriot parliament approved the budget for the 
purchase of 43 APCs (BMP-3 type) from Russia ’^\  On September 29, 1995, 18 hi- 
tech BMP-3 armoured vehicles arrived at Cyprus together witi the Russian experts 
wlio came to train Greek Cypriot soldiers*’'’. On October 22, 1995, Fileleftheros 
reported that the Parliament approved the budget for 24 additional BMP-3 Russian 
armoured vehicles' ’^’. On December 5, 1995, Mr. derides took the possession of 
Leonidas APCs in Greece. 84 of these APCs arrived at South Cyprus on December 
12, I995'^^^
Another important development was the decision to construct naval and air 
bases in South Cyprus for the use of Greece. The naval base would be constructed at 
Larnaca and the air base would be at PaphoS. Accordingly, it was announced that, 
for the protection of those bases, missiles would be bought and these missiles would 
be surface-to-air and medium ranged'’^ . All these decisions were in accordance with 
the Joint Defence Doctrine that was signed between Greece and South Cyprus in 
1993.
At the beginning o f 1996, the Greek Cypriot government prepared the new 5- 
year defence program which was dedicated to air defence. According to the 
program, the main aim would be to complete the construction o f an air base in 
Paphos and to purchase anti-aircraft missiles^”. For the new program, the Greek
"Miliuiiy Balance in Cyprns." Alilliia (March 11, 199.')).
“The Purchase of Armoured Vehicles has been Approved.'' Mahi (June 24, 1995).
*’*’ T.R.N.C. the Mini.stry of Foreign Affairs. Greek Cypriot Rearmament. Extracts From the 
Greek Cypriot Daily Newspapers (Nicosia, 1996), 4.
Ibid. 5.
Ibid. 6.
Ibid. 7.
™ T.R.N.t^ the Mini.stry of Foreign Affairs. Greek Cypriot Rearmament. Extracts From the 
Greek Cypriot Press. (Nicosia, December 1996), 2.
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Cypriot government would alloeate 1,250 million Cyprus Pounds. To be able to 
increase the incomes of the Defence Contribution Fund, the cabinet would propose 
to increase the deductions from 2% to 3%^'. The missiles would be purchased from 
Russia and their type would be S-300-PM U-1. Its range is 150 km for aircrafts and
40 km for missiles^'.
On March 21, 1996, the Greek Cypriot Defence Minister Costas Eliades signed 
an agreement with Russia. According to the agreement, both countries would 
cooperate on technical and defence matters. The Russians would provide technical 
sui)port for the arms purchased or to be purchased by South Cyprus^ .^ With this 
agreement, the Greek Cypriots purchased 41 T-80 type MBTs from that country. 
Also Russia took the responsibility to train the Greek Cypriot National Guards for 
operating these tanks and to provide technical support’“'. According to Mr. 
Aristotelous, with the purchase of the new MBTs, "the Turks no longer have 
complete superiority in terms of main battle tanks; Whereas the ratio o f Turkish 
army to National Guard tanks was 6:1, it is now around 4:1...
In October 1996, the news about the purchase of Russian-made S-300 anti­
aircraft missiles became more popular in the Greek Cypriot press. According to the 
Simerini, dated October 15, 1996, "the purchase o f these missiles will bring about 
radical changes in the geo-strategic picture of Cyprus"’*’. Again on October, Greek 
Cypriot weekly Tharros wrote that the Greek Cypriot administration was planning to
" Ibid. 35. 
Ibid. 3. 
Ibid. 7. 
Ibid. 8. 
Ibid. 20. 
’*’ Ibid. 31.
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purchase French-made multi-barrel Mistral rocket-launchers and Russian-made Mil- 
Mi 28 attack helicopters’ .^
In 1997, the Greek Cypriot administration began to work on a program that 
included a plan to modernize EE-9 Cascavel armoured vehicles’*. On December 3, 
1997, Glafcos derides announced that the Greek army in South Cyprus is being 
strengthened. Also, in addition to the T-80s that were purchased in 1996, the Greek 
Cypriot administration announced that they were planning to buy additional T-80s 
and Aspide and Mistral missiles’ .^
On January 21, 1998, the air base that was constructed in Paphos for the use of 
Greek warplanes was handed over to the Greek Cypriot government. The new base 
was named Andreas Papandreu, the ex-prime minister o f Greece*'*.
On February 2, 1998, the Greek Cypriot government had sent 52 officers from 
the Greek Cypriot army to Russia to be educated about the electronic parts, 
maintenance and launching techniques of S-300s*'. Correspondingly, 200 officials 
from the Russian army would go to South Cyprus that would be responsible for the 
preparations for the deployment of the S-300 missiles in South Cyprus*’. 
Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriot administration started to talk about the continuous 
postponement of the dates of the delivery of the missiles.
On April 18, 1998, the Greek Cypriot army had decided to purchase Kentavros 
type armoured combat vehicles (ACV) from Greece**.
”  Ibid. 3.1.
™ K.K.T.C. the Mini,sli y of Foreign Affairs and Defence, Information Office. Militarization 
Activities of Greek Cypriot Administration (Nicosia, 1999), I.
Ibid. 3.
Ibid. 4.
Ibid. .*>.
Ibid. 10.
Ibid. 7.
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On August 6, 1998, the Greek Cypriot Parliament, once more, approved a 1% 
increase in the deductions for the Defence Contribution Fund. The new deduction 
rale would be 3% '^.
Towards the end of 1998, debates about the delivery and future o f S-300s 
between Greece and South Cyprus became tenser. During the meeting that took 
place in Athens on November 28, 1998, Greece insisted on the deployment of the 
missiles at Crete, whereas the Greek Cypriots supported the idea of bringing the 
missiles into Cyprus and keeping them stored as the last concessioi/^. According to 
the weekly called EPTA, the scenario that foresees the deployment o f the missiles in 
Crete becomes more and more possible’’^’.
At the end of 1998, the cancellation of the deployment of S-300s in Cyprus was 
announced by the Greek Cypriot government. This decision caused debates among 
the Greek Cypriot community. To compensate for this loss o f face, they announced 
their aim to purcha.se TOR-MI surface-to-air missiles from Russia. In addition, in 
January 1999, the Greek Cypriot administration made known its goal to purchase 41 
T-80 MBTs to the Greek Cypriot army’’’.
*' Ibid. I.'t.
Ibid. 1.*).
“CIcridex: There is No More Postpones for the Missiles.” EPTA (November 8, 1998). 
T.R.N.C. the Mini.stry of Foreign Affairs and Defence, Information Office. The 
Militarization Activities of the Greek Cypriot Administration. (Nicosia. 1999), 17.
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3.CIIAPTER III:
TME EFEECTS OF THE JOINT DEFENCE DOCTRINE ON THE
CYPRUS THEATRE AND THE LAUSANNE BALANCE BETWEEN
GREECE AND TURKEY
The Joint Defence Doctrine was signed between Greece and the Greek Cypriot 
administration as a defence pact against a joint opponent: Turkey. With this 
agreement, the Greek Cypriots wanted to link tlieir defence to tliat of Greece and, 
thus, increase tlieir defence capabilities.
One important effect of the Joint Defence Doctrine was its influence on the 
Lausanne balance that was established with the Lausanne Treaty. The Lausanne 
Treaty is the one that is supported and wanted to be protected by the Turks. On the 
othei' hand, it is wanted to be altered by the Greeks in their favour.
3.1. Lau.sanne Treaty and the Lausanne Balance:
The Lausanne Treaty was signed on 1923 between Greece, France, Italy, Japan, 
Romania, the United Kingdom, Yugoslavia and Turkey, after the successful 
Independence War of Turkey against foreign invasion forces and the Greek army 
that had occupied the Aegean region. With this Treaty, which was seen as a big 
diplomatic victory by the many, the status quo between the two important
43
Medilcnanean counlry lias been established. This status quo liad remained unaltered 
until today, except the transfer of 12 Aegean Islands to Greece'.
The Lausanne Treaty specified the current borders of Turkey and the borders 
between Greece and Turkey. The new Treaty replaced the Serves Treaty that was 
imposed on Turkey by the victorious powers of the First World War. With this 
Treaty, the Republic o f Turkey lost important territories in Thrace to Greece and 
Bulgariaf Over one million Greek and Turkish population was exchanged as they 
were on the wrong side of the border’. The sovereignty over the islands o f Lemnos, 
Samothrace, Mytilcne, Chios, Samos and Nikaria were given to Greece.
According to the Treaty, those islands would be kept demilitarized by Greece 
as a result of Turkey’s reservations. According to Turkish way of looking, these 
islands were too close to Turkish Aegean coasts and their demilitarized status was 
vital for the security of Turkish territory. On the other hand, two islands that 
controlled the entrance of the Dardanelles were given to Turkey to keep the balance 
between the two countries.
In addition, population exchanges would take place between Turkey and 
Greece. This principle would not be valid for the Greeks o f Istanbul and the Turks of 
Thrace. According to Üter Turan and Dilek Barlas, “there would be a population 
exchange such that the temptation of each side to extend protection to its kind 
across the border and to claim territory from the other would be considerably
' Şükrü S. Gürel, Tariliscl Boviit İçinde Tiirk-Yuiinn İlişkileri (1821-1993), (Turkish Greek 
Relations in Historical Perspective (1821-199.3)). (Ankara, Omit Yayıncılık. 199.3), 11-12.
’ liter Tiiran-Dilek Barla.s, "Ttirki.sh-Greek Bokince.A Key to Peace and Cooperation in the 
Balkans," East European Ouarterly, Vol:32, No:4, January 1999, 469-488.
’ Şükrü Elckclağ. “Selected Topics in the Turkish Foreign Policy," lectures delivered at Bilkent 
University (Ankara, .Scptember-Deceinber 1997).
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rccluced”'. If (his was (he real reason behind (he populaiion exclianges, (his can be 
(he proof of poIi(ical charac(er of (lie Lausanne Treaiy.
Nevei'dieless, one iinpor(ant deveiopmeni (ook place af(er (he Second World 
War (ha( aUered (lie Lausanne balance in favour of Greece. With the end of the 
Second World War, Gieece acquired the sovereignty of Dodecanese Islands. Those 
islands were taken by Italy during Turco-Italian war in 1911. Later, Germany 
occupied (he islands during (he Second World War. With the defeat o f Germans, 
Greece took the possession of them'. As because the relations were friendly during 
Atatürk and Venizelos period, Turkey didn’t react it.
The important points of the Lausanne Treaty and the Lausanne balance are as 
follows:
/- The demilitarization o f the Eastern Aegean islands.
As because these islands were too close to the Turkish coasts, the Treaty 
foresees the demilitarization of those islands to ensure the security of Turkish 
Aegean coasts.
2- Three miles width of territorial waters.
Free and equal access to high seas of the Aegean.
Since the width of the territorial waters of the both countries is three miles, 
beyond three miles, both countries have the right of free and equal access to the high 
seas o f the Aegean.
However, this regulation has been changed by the unilateral action of Greece 
which increased the width of her territorial seas to 6 miles.
'/-Three miles air space above the Aegean Sea.
liter Turan- Dilek Barias, 473. 
' Ibid. 473.
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In accordance with the three miles width of the territorial waters in the Aegean 
Sea, both countries iiave sovereign rights above the 3 miles territorial waters in the 
Aegean' ’^.
Accoiding to Şükrü Elekdağ, “The scope of the Lausanne Treaty transcends a 
mere peace treaty in the sense that it is not just a formal contractual agreement to 
cease hostilities and to determine new boundaries, but it also establishes a regime for 
an overall peaceful settlement of the disputed issues between the two countries”. He 
also adds that “The Lausanne Treaty made possible the establishment of an 
atmosphere o f friendship and cooperation between Turkey and Greece which lasted 
for three decades by providing the ground for a balanced settlement of a wide range 
of issues involving the entangled and interlocked interest of both countries’”.
3.1.1. Greek and Turkish Attitudes Towards the Lausanne Balance:
Between 1923 and the beginning of 1970s, the Lausanne balance seemed to 
satisfy the both sides. Nevertheless, starting with the 1970s, the clashes in the 
interests of these two countries, especially with the Cyprus conllict and the territorial 
waters problems in the Aegean, caused increasing tension between Greece and 
Turkey* .
The Greek attitude towards the Lausanne balance was to alter it as much as 
possible in favour of herself. To this end, the Greek leaders used the tactic o f fait 
accompli in the Aegean Sea. They preferred to keep the relations tense and, because 
of this, to establish a defence pact with the Greek Cypriots.
Şükrü Elekdağ, "Selected Topics in the Turkish Foreign Policy," lectures delivered at Bilkent 
University (Ankara, Septeinber-Deceniber 1997).
 ^ Ibid.
* Şükrü S. Gürci. 66.
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To acliievc their goal, the Greeks’ first action was to extend their sovereignty 
over Dodecanese Islands at the end of the Second World War. The emergence of 
guerilla movement in Cyprus by the Greek Cypriots, which was secretly supported 
by Greece, against British was another development against the Lausanne balance’.
The remilitarization o f the Aegean Islands by Greece was their another action 
which was an.swered with the counter action of Turkey in order to save the 
Lausanne balance. Turkey argues that this action is against the Lausanne Treaty, the 
Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits and other related international 
agicements"*. In addition, Greece claims that the width of its territorial waters is 12 
miles which is agaiti protested by Turkey. If Greece extends its sovereignty to 12 
miles within the Aegean Sea, according to Şükrü Elekdağ, “Greece, by virtue of 
almost 3,000 Greek islands, islets, and rocks would acquire approximately 71.5% of 
the Aegean Sea, while Turkey’s share would increase only by 1.2% to 8.7%’’". 
According to Şükrü Elekdağ, “in case Greece extends its territorial waters to 10 or 
12 miles in the Aegean, this would have the following consequences for Turkey: 
-I’urkey would not be able to carry out naval or aerial military exercises on the 
Aegean.
-All the flights of Turkish aircraft over the Aegean would require Greece’s 
permission.
-Turkey would be denied the right of defending its territory from forward areas 
using international sea areas and international air space in the Aegean.
'* liter Tınan- Dilek Barla.s, 472.
"* Ibid. 477.
" Şükrü Elekdağ, "Selecied Topics in the Turkish Foreign Policy,” lectures delivered at 
Bilkeiil University (Ankara, September-Deceinber 1997).
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-...tlircc sdails would be formed in the Aegean and Turkish vessels to sail between 
Black Sea and the Mediterranean will have to obtain Greece’s penuission”'^ .
If all these possibilities become real, the balance in the Aegean Sea will be 
totally in favour of Greece and this will undoubtfully abolish the ‘delicate”  ^
Lausanne balance between Turkey and Gieece.
In recent yeais, secret support for the terrorist organizations that work against 
the integrity o f Turkey gained importance within this policy. All these tactics were 
being used by Greece in order to increase its own power and to decrease Turkey’s 
power against Greece. In such, it would manage to change the Lausanne Balance in 
favour of Greece.
On the other hand, Turkey is in the position o f a defendant country. As the 
more powerful and the advantageous side in Turco-Greek relations, Turkey’s goal 
has been to keep its superior position against Greece’s efforts. Turkey’s aim is to 
protect the status quo and to make Greece obey the regulations o f Lausanne Treaty 
by the help of negotiations with that country'''.
The Turkish War of Independence had ended and the borders of the new 
Turkish Republic had been established with the signing of the Lausanne Peace 
Treaty in July 1923 which had replaced the Sèvres Treaty that was imposed on the 
Ottoman Empire by the Allied powers'^ Since then, the main goal of the Turkish 
foreign policy has been to protect those borders that were established with the 
Lausantie Trealy. According to Turan and Barlas, “this owes much to the historical
Ibid,
" İller Turnn-Dilck Bnrlas, 473. 
" Şükrü. S. Gürci, 93-94.
İller Tnraii-Dilek Barlas, 470.
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memory lhal the Empire liad been receding from the Balkans all throughout the 
nineteenth century”'^
The security of the new-born republic lay on retaining the stability in the region 
and, in order to retain the stability, protecting the balance between Turkey and 
Gieece established with the Lausanne Treaty.·
When the Greek side had chosen the policy of changing the Lausanne balance, 
Turkey began to take some counter-measures in order to prevent it because of the 
reasons mentioned above. Instead of making initiatives, those actions have a 
reactionary character that were being done as an answer to the Greek initiatives.
After keeping silent against Greece’s acquisition of the Dodecanese Islands, 
Turkey began to protect the balance by using all possible policies, including war. The 
best example of this decisiveness can be seen in the Cyprus War o 1974. In addition, 
the action of remilitarization of the Aegean Islands by Greece was answered with the 
establishment of a new army near İzmir with the purpose of ‘meeting contingencies 
which might arise in the Aegean with Greece’”. When Greece announced the limits 
of its territorial waters as 12 miles, Turkey announced that it would consider such an 
action as a ca.sux belli
3.2. The Joint Defence Doctrine:
It is quite controversial to talk about any kind of a defence pact between Greece 
and South Cyprus wliile the former mentions better relations with Turkey and the 
latter supports the idea of a ‘peaceful settlement’ to the Cyprus question.
'Mbicl. 471. 
” Ibid. 477. 
Ibid. 478.
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Despite all the rhetorie, the high-level government delegations from Greece and 
South Cyprus, which were headed by Glafcos derides and Greek Premier Andreas 
Papandreou, signed an agreement in Athens in November 1993 which was called 
Joint Defence Doctrine.
The main aim of the Doctrine was to adapt a common defence policy and to 
integrate Southern Cyprus into the defence sphere of Greece. The center of the Joint 
Defence Doctrine and the new military plans would be Crete” .
Mr. derides announced that the reason of this doctrine was the unbalance 
existing between the two sides in Cyprus and it was unbearable for the Greek 
Cypriots anymore’". According to the Doctrine, any attack against the Greek 
Cypriots would be accepted by Greece as an attack against herselP'. The Joint 
Defence Doctrine includes all o f the ‘Hellenic area’ which includes the belt from 
Cyprus, Aegean, Trace, Macedonia and Epir ’^.
The new military plans of Greece and South Cyprus in accordance with the 
Joint Defence Doctrine would be as follows:
1- The harmonization of arms purchases to make them more effective. This would 
mean the coordination and joint decisions while purchasing weapons.
2- The construction of infrastructure in accordance with the cooperation of land, 
marine and air forces. They would be for the use of Greek forces in South Cyprus.
3- The construction of a Greek air and naval bases in South Cyprus. The Greek naval 
base would be established at Mari village in Larnaca and an air base in Paphos area.
The air base which would be established in Paphos would be wanted to be 
protected with surface-to-air missiles and this would create S-300 crisis.
"The Centcrof the Joint Defence is Crete." Simeriiii (November 29, 1993). 
“  "Power Bdldnee" Filcleftheros (November 19, 1993).
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4- The recruitment of 5000 volunteers who would serve for 5 years in order to use 
the armoured vehicles and modern arms systems. The new recruits would increase 
the amount of total armed forces to 15,000 from 10,000.
5- The Greek Contingent in South Cyprus and the National Guard would be 
mechanized and the firing powers of both would be increased. It would mean 
increased efforts of rearmament of both the National Guard and The Greek army in 
South Cyprus.
6- The organization of joint military exercises that was being done by the Greek 
Cypriot National Guard once in a year named “Nikiforos”' \  This would mean the 
night of Greek jets over Cyprus that would create dangerous dog-fights with the 
Turkish F-16s.
7- The inclusion of South Cyprus in European system of collective security. The 
entry would result with the decision of the Greek Cypriot administration to enter 
into EU as the government of the whole Cyprus without any kind o f solution.
8- The reorganization and empowerment of the reserves and, to achieve this, the use 
of Greek military officers for the training of the reserves^'. This would result with 
better organized and powered 88,000 reserve in addition to 15,000 total armed 
forces.
In August 1994, in accordance with the provisions o f the Doctrine, the first joint 
military exercise was held between the naval and air forces of Greece and the
■' “Military Meetings in Athens.” Agon (December 23, 1993).
“The Reannainent.” Simerini (December 31, 1993).
T.R.N.C. Prime Ministry, Public Relations Office. The Joint Defence Doctrine between South 
Cyprus and Greece. (Nicosia, 1996), 1-2.
■' “Rapid Development in the Joint Defence.” Simerini (April 10, 1994).
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National Guard of South Cyprus. Starting from that date, joint military exercises 
had been repeated every year^\
'I’he stated aims of the Joint Defence Doctrine have been given above. But are 
they the real aims? Or what is the main purpose of this Doctrine? Is it purely 
defensive or docs it include offensive purposes also?
There are many ideas about the purpose of this Doctrine. The stated aim is to 
restore a power balance in the area and to bring Cyprus under the defence umbrella 
of Greece in order to save it from Turkey’s control and influence·''. On the other 
hand, in many instances, the rhetoric of the Greek Cypriot leadership tends to be the 
proof o f some oficnsive purposes of the Doctrine. On April 2, 1995, Glafcos 
Cleridcs said to Agon newspaper that “Our struggle that has started forty years ago 
hasn’t yet been completed. Our struggle will only end with the liberation of the 
whole of Cyprus”. His another speech that he delivered to Fileleftheros, on July 18, 
1995, shows the same mentality: “There are two alternatives open to us if the Greek 
Cypriot side decides on a change of policy. One of the alternatives is military action. 
The other is to work for the international sanctions against Turkey. The decision on 
military action can not be taken by Cyprus alone and in any case the situation must 
be carefully weighted so as not to put in danger Southern Cyprus”. Also, on 
September 28, 1998, upon the question bf “Could tlie Joint Defence Doctrine be 
turned into a Joint salvation doctrine?”, Mr. derides answered “Every defence 
constitutes an element o f attack”.
On the other hand, it has been suggested that the Joint Defence Doctrine was a 
political move aimed at the strengthening of the Greek Cypriot position on the
·' T.R.N.C. Prime Ministry, Public Relations Office. The Joint Defence Doctrine between South 
C'vprus and Greece. (Nicosia, 1996), I.
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negotiation table. On September 2, 19%, Greek Defenee Minister Gerasimos 
Arsenis said that “The pact has improved the negotiating position of both Cyprus 
and Greece”. He also argued that the agreement had dramatically changed the 
region’s military balance in the favour of Greece” .
It has also been argued that the aim of the Greek Cypriot administration is to 
justify its argument of “Turkish threat” by keeping the relations with the Turkish side 
tense and, in such, open its way towards a collective security by entering into EU in 
order to protect its own existence.
3.3. The Effecis of the Joint Defence Doctrine:
3.3.1. The Effects on the Cyprus Theatre:
The .loint Defence Doctrine is one side of the continuing rearmament of the 
Greek Cypriots in Cyprus. The Doctrine organizes the weapon purchases and 
hai monizes them with the weapon purchases of its motherland Greece.
With this Doctrine, Greece enters into' the Cyprus theatre with its military 
jrersonnel, air and naval forces and defence strategies. Before the Doctrine, Greece’s 
existence in Cyprus was questionable and its effectiveness was little. Nevertheless, 
with the Doctrine and the resulting bases Greece will be in Cyprus with its air and 
naval forces permanently. The joint military exercises undoubtfly would attract the 
reaction of the Turkish army in North Cyprus that would create tenser situation in 
the area.
One o f the aims of the Doctrine was to include the whole of Cyprus in European 
syslem o f collective security. The entry of Cyprus into European system of collective
“The Joint Defence Doctrine. Bles.'; or Curse? ' Mahi (October 25, 1998).
”  “ “Defence Poet with Greece Un.shokohle". .soys Arsenis." Cyprus Mail (Septembei· 3, 1996).
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seciirily will mean (he abolishmenl of (he Guaran(ee Agreements and 7’urkey’s status 
as the guarantor power. The possible entry of Cyprus to tlie EU will result with the 
departure of tlie Turkish army from Cyprus.
To conclude, the Joint Defence Doctrine, if achieved, will bring the absolute 
superiority of (he Turkish side to the end. Their success will change the balance of 
power in the Cyprus theatre. This change in Cyprus will also influence Turkish- 
Greek relations and the balance between them.
3.3.2. The Effects on Turkish-Greek Relations and the Lausanne Balance:
I ’ui key and Greece are the two ally countries of NATO. Turkey and Greece are 
the vital members of the organization which make up the Southern Flank. 
Nevertheless, one of these two allied countries signed a defence pact with another 
country against its ally. The most important effects of the Joint Defence Doctrine on 
Turkish-Greek relations are the materialization of lack of trust and the existence of 
tense relations.
The clauses of the Doctrine proves Greek’s ambitions in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Aegean. These ambitions are to gain more influence and 
control in those areas. As the leader country of the area, it was obvious that Turkey 
would react to this initiative and take needed measures which will worsen the 
relations between two countries.
As we said before, the Lausanne Treaty was an important document that 
established a balance between Turkey and Greece. The Joint Defence Doctrine, 
which aimed at the change in the balance in the Eastern Mediterranean in favour of 
Greece and Greek Cypriots, automatically becomes an agreement against the 
Lausanne balance. It does not only aims at the change of balance between Turkish
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In its relations with Greece, Turkey has relative superiority in the Aegean 
region. In case of an armed confrontation, Turkey’ s biggest advantage and master­
card will be Cyprus. To overcome any possible disadvantaged situation of Turkey in 
the Aegean, its absolute superiority in the island of Cyprus is vital. According to 
Şükrü Elekdağ, “Greeks are cognizant of the fact that in the event that they escalate 
the crisis in the Aegean to a hot conflict, this will force Turkey to take military 
measures in Cyprus. Greece is aware of her vulnerability in Cyprus... the presence of 
'l urkish troops in Cyprus is an additional and effective deterrent compelling Greece 
to think twice concerning her initiatives in the Aegean’’’“. Because of this 
importance, any initiative towards changing the absolute superiority of Turkey in 
Cyprus will directly influence the balance in the Aegean.
The construction of air and naval bases in South Cyprus means permanent 
existence o f Greek forces in the island. In case of an armed confrontation this will 
harden the situation of Turkish side. The new bases and other infrastructure, which 
would be constructed according to the Joint Defence Doctrine, 5000 additional 
volunteers, newly organized weapon purchases and defence planning and 
mechanized and empowered National Guard would increase the defence capabilities 
of Soutli Cyprus. As a result, the absolute superiority of the Turkish side in Cyprus 
would become questionable. This possible change in the balance in the Cyprus 
theatre will directly influence Turkish-Greek relations and the balance between them.
and Greek side in Cyprus, but also tries to ehange the overall balance, to some
extend, between Turkey and Greece.
2«Şükrü F.Ickdag, “2 '/2  War Slrateev." Pcrcentions. Marcli-May 1996, ,33-57.
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measures in Cyprus. Greece is aware of her vulnerability in Cyprus... the presence of 
Turkish troops in Cyprus is an additional and effective deterrent compelling Greece 
to think twice concerning her initiatives in the Aegean’’^ ''. Because of this 
importance, any initiative towards changing the absolute superiority of Turkey in 
Cyprus will directly influence the balance in the Aegean.
The construction of air and naval bases in South Cyprus means permanent 
existence of Greek forces in the island. In case o f an armed confrontation this will 
harden the situation of Turkish side. The new bases and other infrastructure, which 
would be constructed according to the Joint Defence Doctrine, 5000 additional 
volunteers, newly organized weapon purchases and defence planning and 
mechanized and empowered National Guard would increase the defence capabilities 
of South Cyprus. As a result, the absolute superiority of the Turkish side in Cyprus 
would become questionable. This possible change in the balance in the Cyprus 
theatre will directly influence Turkish-Greek relations and the balance between them.
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extend, between Turkey and Greece.
.Slikrii F.Ickdng, “2 '/2 War Slralef>y;' Pcrcenlions. March-May 1996, 33-57.
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Ill acitlilion, (he Joint Defence Doctrine does not only relate to Cyprus. It also 
includes the defence planning of the area from Macedonia to Cyprus. The Doctrine 
foresees a belt around Turkey starting from Trace and reaching to Cyprus in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. This is also the area whom the balance has been established 
in 1923 with the Lausanne Treaty. Any change in the military strength o f the either 
side in any place within that area will undoubtfully change the Lausanne balance. To 
change (he balance in the area in favour of Greece is the aim of the Joint Defence 
Doctrine.
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4.CHAP7ER IV:
TflE RESULT OF TOE REARMAMENT EFFORTS OF THE GREEK 
CYPRIOTS AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE BALANCE OF THE AREA
4. ]. Cyprus Conflict:
I'he Cyprus conflict is the conflict of two nations: Turks and Greeks that liad 
come together and lived peacefully in the island o f Cyprus until tlie last century. The 
Turkish set Hers came into the island in 1571 after its conquest by the Ottoman 
Empire. The roots of the most important characteristie o f the Cypriot community 
dualism between Turks and Greeks, lie in the MILLET system o f the Ottomans 
which was later developed with the ‘divide and rule’ policy o f Bi itish.
The Greek Cypriots hoped that with the transfer of administration of the island 
to (he British, (hey would achieve their historical goal ENOSIS. But history didn’t 
develop as they hoped.
The Greek Cypriots’ fight for independence from the British has turned Cyprus 
into an island of violence and conflict that continued until today. Under the pressure 
of armed conflicts between the two communities and the British, the Republic of 
Cyprus has been established. The agreements, Zurich, London and Guarantee, that 
enabled the establishment of the Republic were signed between Greece, Turkey and 
Britain and (he Guarantee Agreement made those three countries guarantors of the 
Republic o f Cyprus.
.‘>9
Nevertheless, (lie new Republic could only live for three years. The death of the 
Republic came with the proposal of the Greek Cypriot President of 13-amendments 
to the Constitution. According to the Turkish Cypriot side, these amendments would 
convert the position of their own side from equal partners to the minority. Years 
later, it became known that 13-amendments were a part of the Akritas Plan that 
aimed at the elimination of the whole Turkish population and the achievement of 
ENOSIS. On 21 December 1963, the armed onslaught against the Turkish Cypriots 
started and continued until 1974 with intervals.
In 1964, the UN Peace-Keeping Force was sent to the island but proved to be 
ineffective in keeping peace. UNFCYP is still in the buffer zone in Cyprus which is 
located between the Turkish and Greek areas.
As the result of the harsh reactions from Turkey, Makarios realized that they 
could not achieve their goal with the use of force against the Turkish Cypriots. Thus, 
he tried to change his policy and imposed economic sanctions on the Turkish 
community. Nevertheless, when the military junta came to power in Greece in 1974 
and forced Makarios to achieve ENOSIS as soon as possible, the two sides, 
Makarios and junta, began to have conflicting opinions about the problem of 
achieving ENOSIS and this disagreement resulted with the bloody coup in Cyprus 
against Makarios which was organized by the Greek military junta. This vital mistake 
of the Greek side caused the Peace Operation of Turkey on July 20, 1974, in the 
name of protecting the integrity and independence of Cyprus. The Peace Operation 
of 1974, changed the overall balance between the Turks and the Greeks of Cyprus in 
favour of the Turkish side. With this military, victory of Turkey, the Turks took the 
control of 37% of the island of Cyprus which was named as an ‘invasion’ by the
many.
6Q
Al the end of the first intercommunal talks in Vienna, the question of transfer of 
population was settled. Totally homogenous Turkish and Greek populations on each 
side of the island have been achieved.
On February 13, 1975, the Turkish Cypriots announced the establishment of the 
Turkish Federated Stale of Cyprus. The announced aim of them was to form a basis 
for a possible future federated state with the Greek Cypriots of South Cyprus.
The Four-Guidelines had been reached between Archbishop Makarios and Mr. 
Denkta? on April 1975, With these Guidelines, both sides accepted that they are 
seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, federal republic.
After the death of Makarios, Mr. Denktaç met with the new leader of the Greek 
Cypriots, Mr. Kyprianou, and they agreed on a new set of principles which is known 
as the Ten-Point Agreement. According to the Agreement, the intercommunal talks 
would start on June 15, 1979. The basis would be the Four-Guidelines and the UN 
resolutions. The Republic of Cyprus would be demilitarized and independence, 
sovereignly, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic would be 
guaranteed against union with any othei countiy.
With the numerous intercommunal talks that took place, both sides tried to find a 
negotiated solution to the Cyprus problem which the outcome was negative. On 
November 15, 1983, the Turkish Cypriot side announced independence and 
established the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. On the other hand, the 
negotiations with the Greek Cypriot side continued in order to find a solution for the 
Cyprus problem. The high-level meetings took place in Vienna on November 1984, 
in Nicosia buffer-zone on September 1988, in New York on February 1990 which 
were disturbed with the application of the Greek Cypriot side for full membership in 
the EC as the Republic of Cyprus.
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Il was Ihc new Secretary-General of tlie UN Boutros Boutros Gliali that 
prepared the ‘Set of Ideas’ in order to reconstruct the deteriorated basis of the 
negotiations. According to the Set ofldeas, the both sides would establish a federal 
republic that would ensure equal political rights to both of the communities. Each 
federal stale would be administered by one community and would decide its own 
governmental constitution. The legislature would be composed of a lower house and 
an upper house. The lower house would be bi-communal with a 70:30 Greek 
Cypriot / Turkish Cypriot ratio. The upper house would have 50:50 ratio. In the 
1993 elections, Mr. derides came to power in South Cyprus atid had announced 
that he was against the Set ofldeas.
In ordei' to find an exit to the deadlock, the UN Secretary-General prepared the 
‘Confidence Building Measures’ in July 1993. The CBMs foresaw that the 
cooperation of experts on the issue of water problem and education would take 
place between the two sides and Varosha and Nicosia International Airport, which 
were closed since 1974, would be under the administratio.n on the UN until reaching 
an agreement to the Cyprus problem.
Nevertheless, another external development took place and ruined the emerging 
positive climate caused by the negotiations on the CBMs. The decision of the Court 
of Justice on July 5, 1994 that forbids North Cyprus’ export o f potato and citrus 
over Turkey caused to the protest of the Turkish Cypriots and they announced that 
they would not continue the negotiations.
According to the Turkish Cypriot side, the European Union always had a 
negative impact on the resolution of the Cyprus problem. When the Greek Cypriots 
applied for membeiship to the EU on behalf of the entire island, this caused the 
protest of the Turkish Cypriot side. In addition, when the EU decided to start the
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negotiations for the full membership of the Greek Cypriots in the Luxembourg 
Summit of December 12, 1997, the Turkish Cypriot side announced that 
intercommunal talks can take place on the basis of two states and any agreement that 
could be reached must have the structure of an agreement between the two states. 
For the Turkish Cypriots, the involvement of the EU complicates the issue and it is 
not in a position to make a positive contribution to the resolution of the conflict. On 
the other hand, according to the Greek Cypriots, the EU is in a unique position to 
play a role in the resolution of this pioblem.
On December 4, 1995, US Presidential Envoy Mr. Richard Beattie and the US 
Special Cyprus Coordinator James Williams came to Cyprus to explore the ways 
towards resuming the intercommunal talks. Their initiative did not bring any positive 
outcome. They were followed by the US Assistant Secretary of State John 
Kornblum and the Office Director for Southern Europe Carey Cavanaugh on April 
25 1996, the UN Secretary-General’s Representative for Cyprus Professor Sun-Joo 
on June 24, 1996 and three times between September 1996 and January 1997, and 
again with Mr. Carey Cavanaugh on November 13, 1996. Nevertheless, none of 
them succeeded in bringing the confiicting parties to the negotiation table.
4.2. The Rearmament of the Greek Cypriot.s: ■
Politically, economically and militarily, Greek Cypriots were the more powerful 
side of the island. Nevertheless, with the Peace Operation on July 1974, this balance 
of power changed in favour of the Turkish side. This new balance still continues
today in terms of mililary power.
The total active manpower of the internationally recognized Republie of Cyprus 
(South Cyprus) is 10,000. On the other hand, the J'urkish a.iny in the North has
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around 30,000 men. I ’his superiority of the Turkish side can be seen also when we 
look at the equipment of both sides. For example, the Greek Cypriot army has 95 
main battle tanks, whereas when we look at the Turkish side, we can see that the 
number reaches 260.
The gap between the powers of the both sides is such a big that it makes many 
Greek Cypriots feel frightened. Mr. Aristos Aristotelous argues that "...in terms of 
numbers, it is much higher that what should be needed for defending that part (North 
Cyprus) of the island. And also because of Turkish proximity, even if the army was 
smaller, the Greek Cypriots would still feel frightened”. This argument of Mr. 
Ai istotclous is proved by the researches of the Cyprus Center for Strategic Studies. 
According to the statistics of the Cyprus Center for Strategic Studies, in 1987, 83% 
of the Greek Cypriots felt threatened by the Turkish military presence in Cyprus. In 
1988, that percentage decreased to 78% and in 1992 to 74%. The reason of this 
decrease probably lies in the drastic increase in the defence expenditures of South 
Cyprus starting from 1988. Between 1987 and 1988, the defence expenditures of 
Cyprus has been doubled.
As it can be seen from Table I (page 67), defence expenditure of South Cyprus 
was $120 million in 1987 and it reached $200 million in 1988. The year 1988 was 
the time of election of Mr. Vasilliti as the President of South Cyprus. Since then, the 
Greek Cypriots, instead of keeping their rearmament effort secret, changed their 
policy and began to inform the public about their success in rearmament.
4.2.1. The Rearmament Before 1988:
Just after the 1974 War, the biggest perceived threat for the Greek Cypriots 
was Greece. At those times, their aim was to protect Cyprus from another coup by
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increasing (he internal security of the country. Nevertheless, wlien they began to see 
no solution to the Cyprus problem that was being negotiated on the negotiation 
table, they began to have increasing fear o f Turkish expansionism, especially after 
the lift of an economic embargo against Turkey in 1978. It was that feeling of 
insecurity against the Turks that made them rely on their motherland Greece.
During 70s and early 80s, there were increasing criticisms about the military 
strength o f South Cyprus. These criticizers accused the governments of giving no 
importance to the defence and armament of the island against increasing Turkish 
threat. In order to overcome these criticisms, the governments continuously 
announced that they were more prepared and powerful that 1974 and were ready to 
any confrontation with the Turks. They supported that they were keeping their 
rearmament .secret because of security reasons. According to Hristodulous 
Benjamin, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Defence, "...another attack and 
progress of Turkey in Cyprus will not be a wandering for the Turks...".
On January 1, 1984, the Greek Cypriots established the Defence Contribution 
Fund. According to the decision of the Council o f Ministers, 0.5% of the salaries of 
all working population would be paid to the Fund as a contribution to the defence. 
By the middle of 1998, this rate would reach to 3% as a result of continuous 
increases to the rate of deductions.
According to Simerini, between 1982-1985, the Greek Cypriots purchased 120 
EE-9 Cascavel armoured vehicles, 18 VAB-VCI and 66 VAB-VTT type APCs and 
those purchases increased the defence capability of South Cyprus dramatically.
In June 1987, the Greek Cypriot government signed an agreement with France to 
purchase an c(|uipment worth $250 million. According to the agreement. South 
Cyprus would buy 16 MB'I's, 4 helicopters, hi-tccli missiles. To cope with this
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TABLE H: DEFENCE EXPENDITURES OF SOUTH CYPRUS
1982-1996
(million $)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
$50 $48 $52 $54 $100 $120 $200 $260 $300 $270 $453 $489 $344 $490 $429
Source: The Military Balance and the World Defence Almanac of various years.
amount of purchase, the policy lliat was cliosen by the Greek Cypriot government 
was to increase the deductions of all the working population to the Defence 
Contribution Fund from 1% to 2%.
4.2.2. The Rearmament After 1988:
The election of Yeorgios Vasilliu as the new president o f South Cyprus in 
February 1988 enabled open and fastened rearmament for the Greek Cypriots. 
During his period, instead of keeping weapon purchases secret because o f security 
reasons, they began to announce them to the public.
Accordingly, (he Vasilliu administration announced that they had prepared two 
5-year plans in order to strengthen the Greek Cypriot army. I ’hey consisted of two 
periods, between 1988-1992 and 1993-1997.
In the beginning of 1991, the Greek Cypriots agreed to decrease the defence 
expenditures. The main reason for this change of policy was the economic problems 
and changing political climate caused by the Gulf War. They were forced to change 
their rearmament programs to be able to fit into the new climate.
In 1993, the Vasilliu administration was replaced by the derides administration. 
Instead of increasing defence expenditures after the Gulf crisis, the new 
administration gave special importance to the development and the training of their 
reserves. In November 1993, the well-known Joint Defence Doctrine was signed 
between the Greek Cypriot government and Greece. According to the new doctrine, 
the decisions on the defence matters would be taken jointly and Cyprus would be 
included within the joint defence plan o f Greece.
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In 1994, (he Greek Cypriot government decided to restart the weapon 
purchases. It was announced that the Greek Cypriots would buy 140 TOMA type 
APCs from Russia.
The new 5-year defence program that was prepared at the beginning of 1996 
aimed at the development of an air defence. The main objective would be to 
complete the construction of an air base in Paphos and to purchase anti-aircraft 
missiles, in accordance with the Joint Defence Doctrine. In the same year, the Greek 
Cypriot government signed an agreement with Russia. According to the agreement, 
both sides would cooperate on technical and defence matters and Russians would 
provide technical support for the arms purchased by South Cyprus. In addition, 
Russians would train the Greek Cypriot National Guards for operating the T-80 type 
MBTs that would be purchased from that country and would provide technical 
support. Also, the Greek Cypriots would purchase surface-to-air missiles (S-300s) 
from Russia.
On January 21, 1998, the construction of the air ba,se in Paphos was completed 
and was handed over to the Greek Cypriot government. In February 1998, 52 
officers from (he National Guard were sent to Russia to be trained for the S-300s. 
Correspondingly, 200 officials from Russia would go to South Cyprus to prepare the 
area for the deployment of the missiles.
Nevertheless, under the pressure of Turkey’s protests and international 
reactions, the Greek Cypriot administration began to postpone the dates of the 
delivery of the missiles. At last, at the end of 1998, the cancellation of the 
deployment of S-300s in South Cyprus was announced by the Greek Cypriot 
government. This caused a turmoil among the Greek Cypriot community. To 
compensate for this loss of face, the Greek Cypriot government announced its aim
68
lo pıırdiasc TOR-MI surfacc-to-air missiles from Russia. Nevertheless, this 
amioimcement did not slop the debates among the Greek Cypriots.
4.3. The Effects of the .Joint Defence Doctrine on the Cyprus Theatre and the 
Jjutsanne Balance Between Greece and Turicey:
The Joint Defence Doctrine that was signed between Greece and Greek 
Cypriot administration has an influence on the Lausanne balance that was established 
with the Lausanne Peace Treaty.
4.3.1. Lausanne Peace Treaty and the Lausanne Balance:
The victory of the Turks against the invasion forces after the War of 
Independence enabled Turkey to sign the Lausanne Peace Treaty with Greece, 
France, Italy, Japan, Romania, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia in 1923. With 
this Treaty, the status quo between the two Mediterranean countries has been 
established and remained unaltered until today, except the transfer o f 12 Aegean 
Islands to Greece. The Treaty specified the borders between Turkey and Greece. 
Over one million Greek and Turkish population was exchanged as the result of the 
transfer of the territories between the two countries. According to liter Turan and 
Dilek Barlas, “there would be a population exchange such that the temptation of 
each side to extend protection to its kind across the border and to claim territory 
from the other would be considerably reduced”. Correspondingly, Şükrü Elekdağ 
also argues that “the scope of the Lausanne Treaty transcends a mere peace treaty in 
the sense that it is not just a formal contractual agreement to cease hostilities and to 
determine new boundaries, but it also establishes a regime for an overall peaceful 
sclllcment of the disputed issues between the two countries”. It can be said that the
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Lausanne Peace Ticaty is not only a legal document but is also a political one that 
established a balance between Turkey and Greece under the light of political climate 
after the victory of'Purkey in the War of independence.
These are the important points of the Lausanne Treaty and the Lausanne 
balance:
1 -The demilitarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands
2- Threc miles width of territorial waters
3- Frec and equal access to high seas of the Aegean
4- Thrce miles air space above the Aegean Sea.
4.3.2. Greek and Turkish Attitudes Towards the Lausanne Balance;
Between 1923 and early 1970s, the Lausanne balance seemed to satisfy both 
Turkey and Gieece. In the beginning of 1970s, many problems between the two, 
including the Cyprus conflict, and the territorial waters problem in the Aegean, 
began to disturb (he existing perceived balance especially for (he Greek side.
According to Greece, the Lausanne balance was the one (hat has to be altered 
for its own interest. To achieve their goal, the Greeks used the tactic of fait acconipli 
in the Aegean, kept relations with Turkey tense and established a defence pact with 
the Greek Cypriots.
At the end of the Second World War, Greece’s fust action was to extend its 
sovereignty over Dodecanese Islands. In addition, Greece secretly supported the 
guerilla movetnent of the Greek Cypriots in Cyprus against British. Also, Greece’s 
reniilitarization of the Aegean Islands was another action that influenced the security 
of (he Lausanne balance of the area was Greece’s claini of the width of its territorial 
waters as 12 miles. In case Greece extends its sovereignty to 12 niiles in the Aegean,
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according lo Şükrü Olekdağ, “Greece, by virtue of almost 3,000 Greek islands, islets 
and rocks would acquire approximately 71.5% of the Aegean Sea, while Turkey’s 
share would increase only...to 8.7%”. This extension will have many consequences 
that will be against the interests of Turkey.
Recently, Greece began to give secret support for the terrorist organizations 
that work against the integrity of Turkey in order to achieve its goal.
On the other hand, Turkey’s position within this affair is that of a defendant 
country. Turkey is the more powerful and advantageous side and, accordingly, its 
goal has been to protect its superiority against Greece’s efforts.
Since the signature of the Lausanne Peace Treaty and the resulting establishment 
of the Republic of Turkey, the aim of Turkey is to protect the borders that were 
established with that Treaty. For its own security, Turkey had to keep the stability in 
the region and, to this end, to protect the balance between Turkey and Greece which 
was established by the Lausanne Treaty.
Accordingly, against the initiatives of Greece in order to change that balance 
between the two Turkey took some counter-measures. Turkey’s actions were of a 
reactionary nature and were being done as an answer to the Greek initiatives.
4.3.3. The .loint Defence Doctrine:
Despite all their rhetoric that included a peace and friendship with the Turks, 
Greece and South Cyprus signed an agreement in Athens in November 1993. It was 
called the Joint Defence Doctrine.
According to the Doctrine, Greece and South Cyprus would adapt a common 
defence policy and South Cyprus would be integrated into the defence sphere of 
Greece. The center of the Doctrine and the new military plans would be Crete. Any
71
allack against llie Greek Cypriots would be accepted by Greece as an attack against 
Iicrseir.
The Joint Defence Doctrine included some military plans for the Greek Cypriots. 
These plans were as follows:
1 -Weapon purchases would be harmonized with Greece in order to make them more 
effective.
2- The construction of infrastructure which would be for the use of Greek forces in 
South Cyprus.
3- The construction of air and naval bases for the use of Greece.
4- 5000 volunteers would be recruited to the army to serve for 5 years.
5- The Greek army in South Cyprus and the National Guard would be mechanized 
and firing powers would be increased.
6- Joint military exercises would be organized.
7- South Cyprus would be included into European system o f collective security.
8- The reserves would be reorganized and empowered.
'fhe question that has to be asked is whether the Joint Defence Doctrine is 
purely defensive or it includes offensive purposes. To answer that question, it will be 
useful to look at the announcements of the Greek Cypriot leaders. On April 2, 1995, 
Glafcos derides said to the Agon that “Our struggle that has started forty years ago 
has not yet been completed. Our struggle will only end with the liberation of the 
whole o f Cyprus”. On September 28, 1998, upon the question of “Could the Joint 
Defence Doctrine be turned into a joint salvation doctrine?”, Mr. Clerides supported 
(hat “Every defence constitutes an element o f an attack”.
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Nevertheless, it lias been suggested llial the Joint Defenee Doctrine was a 
political move aimed at the strengthening of the Greek Cypriot position on the 
negotiation table.
4.3.4. The Effects of the Joint Defence Doctrine:
4.3.4.1. The Effects on the Cyprus Theatre:
The Joint Defence Doctrine ensures the military existence o f Greece in Cyprus, 
apart from the existing Greek Contingent. With the Doctrine, Greece enters into the 
island with its air and naval forces. This entrance will be permanent. Also, the joint 
military exercises between Greece and South Cyprus undoubtedly would increase the 
tension in the area.
If the entry of Cyprus into a European system of collective security is achieved, 
the guarantor status of Turkey will end.
4.3.4.2. The Effects on Turkish-Greek Relations and the Lausanne Balance:
The materialization of lack of trust and the existence of tense relations 
between two NATO countries are the most important effects of the Joint Defence 
Doctrine.
The Joint Defence Doctrine does not only aim at the change of the balance 
between Turkish and Greek sides in Cyprus, but also tries to change the overall 
balance between Turkey and Greece.
The balance between Turkey and Greece also lies in Cyprus. In case of an 
armed confrontalion, Turkey’s absolute superiority in the island o f Cyprus is vital, 
in order to continue its superiority over Greece. The construction of air and naval 
bases foi· the use of Greece in Cyprus means the permanent existence of that country
17,
m llic iskiml. Consequently, this existence will result with the absolute superiority of 
Turkey as Greece’s existence will harden the situation of the Turkish side in case of 
an armed confrontation.
In addition, the Joint Defence Doctrine foresees a belt around Turkey starting 
from Thrace and reaching Cyprus. This area includes the area where the balance has 
been established with the Lausanne Peace Treaty. Any change in terms of the 
military powers of any side will result in the alteration of the Lausanne balance. This 
is the aim ol the Joint Defence Doctiine.
4.4. Results of the Rearmament Efforts of the Greek Cypriots: Snexess or Failure 
When they were faced with the catastrophe of the 1974 War, the Greek 
Cypriots realized how they were militarily vulnerable both against Turkey and 
Greece. As an army of an independent Republic, the military forces of Cyprus failed 
to prevent a coup organized by Greece and an intervention (which is called invasion 
by the Greek Cypriots) by Turkey.
4.4.1 The Comparison of the Selected Equipment of Both Sides;
After 25 years, when we look at the data of the Military Balance 1997/98, we 
can see the Greek Cypriots' advance in defence. The following is the equipment of 
South Cyprus according to the Military Balance 1997/98 and the World Defence 
Almanac 1998/99:
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ГаЫс II:
EQUIPMENT AND MODELS OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS:
EQUIPMENT MODELS
M in 102
AMX-30B2
41
T-80
RECCE 124 EE-9 
CASCAVEL
15 EE-3 
JARAIL\CA
AIFV 27
VAB-VCI
43
BMP-3
A PC 268
LEONIDAS I
118
VAB-VTT
16
AMX-VCT
TOWED
ARTY
75 mm 
4M -II6A 1
88 mm 
24 25-pdr
100 mm 
lOM-1944
105 mm 
72 M-56
155 mm 
12TRF1
SP
ARTY
155 mm 
I2F3
MRL 128 mm 
I2FRY M-63
MOR 81 mm 
180 E 44
81 mm 
70+M I/M 29
107 mm 
20 M-30/M-2
120 mm 
II6R T G I
SSM 3 MM-40 
EXOCET
A'K.VV 45
MILAN
72
IlOT A T -10
RL 66 mm 
M-72 LAW
73 mm 
450 RPG-7
112 mm 
900 APILAS
RCL 90 mm 
40 EM-67
106 mm 
I44M-40A1
AD GUNS 20 mm 
36 M-55
35 mm 
24 GDF-005
40 mm 
20 M-l
SAM 60
MISTRAL
12
ASPIDE
20
SA-7
ATK
WEAPONS
1000
APILAS
Source: The Military Teclinology. The World Defence Almanac I997-9S (Bonii:M(5nch Publishing 
Group, 1998), 67-68 and the International Institute For Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 
1997/98 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 147.
It can ea.sily be seen from the table above that a small country like South 
Cyprus, with 600,000 tc>tal population and 6,738 square km area, has important and 
vast military equipment. According to Amy Truesdoll from Jane’s Intelligence 
Review, “Cyprus is one of the most militarized regions in the world’". Nevertheless, 
South Cyprus shares the island with the Turkish forces which makes the situation
“Nicosia Raises the Stakes on Cyprus,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (April, 1997), Vol:9,
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more complex and explains (lie motive of tlie Greek Cypriots for the rearmament. In 
ordci· to analyze the balance in the area between the Turks and the Greeks, it will be 
useful to compare the forces of the two sides:
4.4.1.1. Tanks:
Tabic 111: COMPARISON OF THE TANKS OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT AND 
TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDES
'1-80
AMX-
30B2
M-48A5
Built hv
Russia
Fiance
US
Fire
Power
10
10
Range
(km)
400
400
290
Max
Spd (kin)
60
65
48
Main
Gun
125inm
105mm
105mm
Max Range 
(meters)
3,000
2,500
2,500
Introduced
1981
1967
1976
Source: Dunnigan, .lames F. 1993. How la Make War: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern 
Warfare for the Post-Cold War Era, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.
T-80s (41 units) and AMX-30B2s (102 unit,s) are owned by the Greek Cypriots and 
M-48A5S (265 units) belong to the Turkish side.
T-8()s are Russian made MBTs which were first introduced by that country in 
1981. While grading the fire power of the MBTs, Dunnigan^ took into consideration 
the performance of the vehicle’s main gun and various types of ammunition, the fire- 
control system, the internal layout and organization of the tank, gun stabilization and 
platform stability, ammunition carried and the rate of fire and, thus, graded T-80s 10 
over 12 which is quite high. AMX-30B2 type tanks, which were introduced in 1967
No:4, 166.
■ .lames F. Dunnigan, IIow to Make War: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare for the 
Posl-Cold War Era, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1993), 96.
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by France and are older than T-80 MBTs of the Greek Cypriots, are graded 9 by 
Diiiinigaiv’.
On the other hand, M -48A 5, type MBTs of the Turkish side have been 
introduced in 1976 and are graded 10 in terms of fire power. There is no difference 
in terms ol the lire powers of the MBTs of the both sides.
Nevertheless, as it can be seen from the table above, the unrefueled range of 
the T-80s and AMX-30B2s, it is 400 km. This range for the M-48A5s is 290 km. 
Thus, in terms of the umefueled ranges, the Greek Cypriot side’s MBTs have the 
superiority. This superiority is valid also in terms of maximum speed and maximum 
range of the main gun in meters. In terms of the calibers o f the main gun in 
millimeters, 'I’-80s are more powerful than M-48A5s. All modern Russian tanks, 
including the T-80s are equipped with gun-launched ATGWs'. They represent the 
peak of Russian armoured vehicle design that include the latest in armour protection, 
firepower, and fire control system technologies’.
To conclude, the Greek Cypriot MBTs are technically superior than the 
Turkish side’s MBTs. Nevertheless, in terms of the numbers, the Turkish side has 
absolute superiority over the Greek Cypriot side. While the Greek Cypriots have 102 
AMX-30 and 41 T-80 type MBTs, the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish army in 
North Cyprus have 265 M-48A5 type MBTs^’. For every Greek МВТ, there are two 
Turkish MBTs in the Cyprus theatre. No matter how hi-tech products they are, the 
MBTs of the Greek Cypriots will possibly exposed to the Turkish MBTs in case of
’ Ibid. 90-98.
■' “The KBP Inxiniwcnl Making Bureau," The Military Balance Special Issue (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), VobXX, No:7, 7.
’ “Russia's Promising Defence Trade Prospects," The Military Technology. VohXX, No:6, 
126.
’^Tlte International Institute For Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 1997-98 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 81.
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an armed confronlalion. Also, the proximity of the Turkish mainland to the island 
and its ability to transfer additional MBTs (possibly M-60A1/A3 and 
LEO PARD lA3s which are better than M-48A5s’) within a short period of time, 
changes the equilibrium for the advantage of the Turkish side in Cyprus.
4.4.1.2. Antitank W eapons:
Antitank weapons are major category o f  conventional arms which are 
designed to counter the tanks* . They are im portant equipm ent during the land 
operations o f a country.
Table IV:
ANTITANK GUIDED WEAPONS OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT AND THE 
TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDES:
NAMK Maker Miniinuni 
Effeclive Range
Maxinuiin 
Effective Ranee
Speed
(nips)
Missile
Weight
(nielers) (meters)
TOW us 65 3,000 360 40
MILAN France 25 2,000 180 32
HOT Fiance 75 4,000 200 32
Source: Dunnigan, 105-106
The Greek Cypriot side owns 45 MILAN and 72 HOT missiles. On the other 
hand, the Turkish Cypriot side has 45 MILAN and 38 TOW.
The comparison of the three kinds of ATGWs results with no technical 
superiority of any of them. TOW and HOT missiles have longer range relative to the
’ Tlie Mililary Technology. The World Defence Almanac 1997-98. 147.
* Shelia Tobias, I’elei Gouclinoff, Stefan Ixacler and Shelah Leader, What Kind of Guns Are 
Thev nuviiig for Your Butter? A Beginner’s Guide to Defence. Weaponry, and Military
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MILAN missiles but the advantageous side of the MILAN missile is that it has 
smaller minimum range which is important characteristic of a weapon in the Cyprus 
tl)eatre. As a small theatre and a place in which the two sides are stationed very 
close to each other (in some cases just a few meters from eacli other), the minimum 
range o f a weapon is more important than its maximum effective range.
MILAN missiles (Missile d’Infantrérie Léger Anti-Char) are in service since 
1972, whereas TOW missiles (Tubelaunched Optically-Tracked Whe-Guided) were 
introduced in 1971. TOW missiles are widely used in the world as the MILAN 
missiles. They have the ability to attack the armour at its most vulnerable point’. 
They can be mounted on a jeep or other vehicle, or even on a helicopter for 
increased mobility"’. HOT missiles were introduced in 1977" and they can also be 
mounted on jeeps, helicopters, light armoured vehicles'l
Accordingly, when we look at the numbers of those missiles o f both sides, we 
see that there is no big gap in terms of the amounts of the ATGWs also. The Greek 
Cypriot side has 117 ATGWs (in addition to an unknown number of AT-10s of 
Russian origin) and the Turkish Cypriots have 83 ATGWs.
In addition to these ATGWs, the Greek Cypriot side has 1000 Apilas type light 
Anti-Tank Weapons (ATKs). These weapons are of French origin and can be carried 
by one person. They are effective against any kind of armoured vehicle and tank.
Spending, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1982), 189.
’ "Infantry Anti-Tank Guided Weapons," Jane’s International Defence Review (January 1996), 
Vol. No: 29, 51-5.3.
'"Tobias, Goudinoff and Leader, 189.
" "Giidiimlii, Mennili. Orta ve Uzun Menzilli Tanksavar Sistemler," (Guided, Projectiled, 
Medium an I,.ong Ranged Antitank Systems), Savunma ve Havacılık (Defence and Aerospace), 
(July-Augu.st, 1990), Vol:4, No:4, 19.
'■ "Euromissile," Savunma ve Havacılık (Defence and Aerospace). (September-October, 1991), 
Vol:5, No:5, 88,
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'riiese weapons were introduced first in 1986. Tlieir effective range is 500 meteis 
whicl) makes these weapons useful within Cyprus theatre.
- O İ .1
4.4.1.3. Air Defence Weapons:
Among air defence weapons, surface-to-air missiles hold an important place in 
the Cyprus theatre. The Greek Cypriot side has 60 MISTRAL, 12 
SKYGUARD/ASPIDE and 20 SA-7 missiles, whereas the Turkish side has an
unknown number of STINGER missiles.
Among these missiles, SA-7s and STINGER missiles are manportable SAMs. 
According to lane's Intelligence Review' ', manportable air defence missiles are not a 
threat during a battle as they were in the past. Today, their proliferation among the 
guerilla groups made these weapons popularly used by the guerillas. Nevertheless, 
because o f its geographic characteristics, Cyprus is not an ideal place for guerilla 
fighting.
SA-7s (Strela-2) were developed by Russia in the early 1960s. The warhead 
of these missiles is much too small to damage significantly large combat aircrafts'·'. 
The Maximum range of SA-7 is 3000 meters if they are departed from jets and is 
3700 meters if they are departed from helicopters’'.
STINGER missiles o f the Turkish side are manportable SAMs also and 
they can be mounted on the vehicles or helicopters” .
” "Gelişen Teknolojiler ve Tanksavar Sistemleri," (Developing Technologies and Anti-Tank 
Systems) Savunma ve Havacılık (Defence and Aerospace). (July-August, 1990), Vol:4, No:4, 
l.-i.
"Russian Manpartable Suıface-to-Air Missiles," Jane's Intelligence Review (Api il 1994), 
Vol:6,No:4, 147.
'' Ihid. 148.
Ihid. I.YJ.
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4.4.2. S-3()0s Crisis:
Tlie decision of the Greek Cypriots to deploy S-300 missiles (SA-10 
'Grumble') around the southwestern coastal city of Paphos was one o f the milestones 
of their rearmament activities.
The S-300s are long-range Russian origin surface-to-air missiles whose 
de]doyment was justified by the following speech o f the Greek Cypriot President 
Glafcos derides: "We will not tie our hands behind our back and allow the Turkish 
Air Force to bomb our towns and villages at will, as it has done in the past, without 
the ability to defend ourselves'"“.
As it can be understood from the rhetoric above, the aim o f the Greek 
Cypriots was to challenge Turkish air supremacy over the island. In order to 
challenge this supremacy, the base has been constructed in Paphos and the S-300s 
were ordered to Russia” .
4.4.2.1. The Characteristics o f S-300s:
The S-300 PMU-1 missiles were introduced in 1993 by Russia. This new 
model o f S-300s has a larger diameter to accommodate more solid fuel and this 
increased (he missile's range to 150 km. The missiles have the system that allows six 
targets to be engaged simultaneously with up to two missiles per target^”. The 
missiles are both an anti-aircraft and anti-missile weapon system^'. Some of the
”  "Armies on Bra o f Change" The Military Technology (June 1998), Vol:XXII, No:6, 48.
"Greek Cypriots Defy Turkey Over S-300 Plan," Jane's Intelligence Review (December 
1997), V ol:9 ,N o:12,7 .
”  "Grumble: Guardian of the Skies," Jane's Intelligence Review (April 1997), Vol:9, No:4, 
\ 53.
••"Ibicl. I.*).!
"S-300 Deployment Moves Closer on Cyprus," Jane's Intelligence Review (July 1998), 
Vol:l(), No:7, 2.
buyers o f these missiles are ex-CzeeliosIovakia, Syria, Iran. China and Bosnian 
Serbs.
4.4.2.2. Turkey's Reaction:
4’he missiles, witli 150 km range are seen as a threat for North Cyprus and 
the southern coasts o f Turkey. Thus, Turkey announced that it would never allow 
the S-300 missiles to be deployed on Cyprus. The Turkish government has stated 
that they are unacceptable because they shift the balance o f power in Cyprus and, 
also, threaten the Turkish Cypriot comnuinity-\
As a reaction and because o f its obligations derived from the Joint Defence 
Doctrine (1993), Greece announced that any attempt o f Turkey to prevent the 
deployment o f S-3()()s would cause war. To ease the situation, the Greek Cypriots 
stated that they might cancel the missile deal if progress can be made in the 
negotiations to the Cyprus problem which was declined by the Turkish Cypriot and 
Turkish side.
Nevertheless, in order to prevent any possible confrontation o f both sides, 
the UvS and Great Britain applied pressure on the Greek Cypriots” . At the end, the 
crisis was solved with the 'intervention' o f the U'S and the resulting mediation efforts 
of US Envoy Carey Cavanaugh-'.
I’ia Chri.s(ina Wood, "Europe ami Turkey: A Relationship Under Fire" Mediterranean 
Quarterly: Winter 1999, 106.
2.1 Ibid. 106.
"Nicosia Raises the Stakes on Cyprus," Jane'.s IiitelliRence Review (April 1997), Vol:9, No:4, 
166-167.
”  "Cypriot S-300 Deployment Finally Gets Under IVrtv - On Crete," Jane's International 
Defence Review (April 1999), Vol. No:.32, .3.
4.4.2.3. "Hie Result of llie Crisis; The Decision to Deploy Them on Crete
In order to calm strong international and Turkish opposition, the Greek 
Cypriots and Greece announced the decision of deployment o f S-300s on Crete. 
According to Jane’s International Defence Review, the owner o f the missiles will be 
the Republic of Cyprus but their operational control will be in the hands o f the 
Hellenic Air Force’'. According to Fileleftheros, the deployment o f the missiles on 
Crete has started in 8 June 1999 and will be completed at the end o f August in the 
same year.
In return, Greece will transfer 21 Tor M l mobile short-range air-defence 
systems to Cyprus. This transfer will be made between the Greek Cypriots and 
Greece.
5.5. The EvaJualion of the Rearnwinent Policy of the Greek Cypriots:
As it can be seen from the previous chapter, the Greek Cypriots had 
important advances in defence within 25 years after the Peace Operation o f Turkey 
in 1974. The hundreds o f millions of dollars that were spent for the defence resulted 
with the filling o f the island of Cyprus with all kinds o f hi-tech weapons and 
thousands o f .soldiers.
The question that has to be asked is whether the Greek Cypriots succeeded 
in their security policy. To be able to answer that question, we have to answer other 
questions beforehand: What was the aiin o f the Greek Cypriots? Why do they spend 
over -$400 million per year for rearmament? Do they have the intention o f an attack 
against North Cyprus in order to 'liberate the whole o f the island'? Or do they aim at 
the sUengthening their defence in order to increase the possible costs o f Turkey in
case of an attack against South Cyprus? Do tliey aim at political benefits and some 
strength for the bargaining at the negotiation table?
To be able to answer all those questions, it will be helpful to analyze the 
equipment owned by the Greek Cypriots. As·it can be seen from the Table II (page 
75), the Greek Cypriot administration gave special importance to the armoured 
vehicles. They have a total o f 1053 armoured vehieles o f different kinds which 
include MBTs, RECCEs, AlFVs and APCs. For the Greek Cypriot population, the 
'armourization' o f their defenee is vital’*'. The total number o f theii' Armoured 
Personnel Carriers (APCs) is 312. APCs are the vehicles which are designed to carry 
equipped soldiers from one place to another and they are considerably weak in 
attack weapons. 1'hus, it is hard to support that APCs are an attack equipment. They 
are important vehicles which supply mobility to the armies. In case o f the Cyprus 
theatre, the mobility o f the Greek Cypriot army is vital for the Greek Cypriots 
because o f their disadvantaged position in terms o f the numbers o f the total armed 
forces against the Turkish side. It is also important to make it known that the total 
number o f the MBTs o f the Greek Cypriots is 143 which can be classified as attack 
weapons as they possess more powerful weappns.
Without doubt, the comparison o f the numbers o f the APCs and the MBTs 
is only a small example but it is important in showing the logic o f the rearmament of 
the Greek Cypriots.
During the archive research for this thesis, I had encountered many news and articles in the 
daily and weekly newspapers of the Geek Cypriots which reflect the importance linked to the
armourization of the defence.
CONLUSiON:
REARMAMENT EOR DEEENCE AND POLITICAL GAINS
Cyprus conflict is the conflict o f the people o f Cyprus which continues for 
more than 40 years. It is the conflict over a small island which is manipulated by the 
external powers.
This thesis aimed to analyze the rearmament efforts o f the Greek Cypriots 
and the real intention behind these efforts. Under the light o f all the information that 
was supplied in the previous sections and chapters, it is possible to say that the aim 
of the Greek Cypriots in rearmament is defending themselves against the Turkish 
military hegemony in Cyprus.
If we look at the equipment o f both sides in the island, it is possible to see 
that "another attack and progress of Turkey in Cyprus will not be a wandering for 
the Turks" as it was in 1974. The current situation is relatively different in the island 
of Cyprus. Another attack o f Turkey, if it takes place, won't be easy for the Turkish 
side as it was in the past. But that does not mean that, in case o f an armed 
confrontation in Cyprus, Turkey won't be able to gain another victory against the 
Gieek Cypriots. Another possible future war will possibly result with the victory of 
Turkey. But the important difference will be that another victory o f Turkey won't be 
an ab,solute and quick one as in the 1974 Peace Operation.
Another possible armed confrontation between Turkish forces and the 
Greek Cypriots will be long and painful for both sides and this will prevent a fait
accompli in (he island. Extended war and Greek Cypriot resistanee in Cyprus will 
give a valuable chance to external powers and international mediators to take action 
in the conflict which will be welcomed by the Greek Cypriots.
Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriots are probably aware that they have no 
chance lo win against the Turkish forces. According to James Brown, “The Greek 
Cypriot National Guard, supported by Greek forces, has strengthened as a defensive 
force, but has little offensive power due to their lack of armour and a tactical air 
force”-^
With the virtue of Joint Defence Doctrine (1993), if Greece enters into 
war with Turkey in ol der to protect its ally, Republic of Cyprus, the situation will be 
more complex and be to the disadvantage o f Turkey. A Turkish-Greek war in the 
Aegean will be destructive and undesired for both sides and for Europe and the US.
Again according to Brown, “a larger confrontation, involving major pushes 
along the Green Line, could quickly escalate into broader war involving both air and 
naval assets in the Aegean Sea and ground and air operations in Thrace^*”.
Nevertheless, all these scenario.s arp based on the possibility o f a Turkish 
attack against South Cyprus. Under these circumstances, continuing the status quo, 
the advantageous position o f Turkey in Cyprus and current conjuncture prevents 
Turkey from taking such an action. But if we look at the situation from the Greek 
Cypriot view, the reverse is possible.
Another possibility which lies in the minds o f the Greek Cypriots is the 
continuation o f the status quo, or lack o f war in Cyprus. If Turkey does not attack
“Tames Brown, Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and 'riirkey. Problems. Policy Choices and 
Mediterranean Security, (London: Brassey s, 1990), 128.
Ibid. 128.
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the vSouth to a give chance to the Greek Cypriots to use their new weapons, they will 
also be able to gain benefits in the international arena. By showing the world that 
they spend over $400 million per year for defence, they can prove the reality and 
closeness o f the Turkish threat. If they can show the world the reality of the Turkish 
threat, they will be able to convince them to exert more pressure on Turkey and the 
Turkish Cypriot side to gi ant compromises on the negotiation table.
Another possible aim of the Greek Cypriots is the political gains of the 
Greek Cypriot leadership. As Aristotelous mentioned, the perception and the belief 
in the minds of the Greek Cypriots that the aim o f the Turks is to capture the whole 
of the island give the political leadership a material that could be grasped for their 
own political benefits. Hostile speeches and the various information that is given to 
the public about the defence of the 'Republic o f Cyprus' makes the political 
leadership the right choice in the eyes of the Greek Cypriot voters.
By increasing the amount of the weapons in the island and by the danger of 
a confrontation (that was what happened in the S-300 crisis), they probably believe 
that they can achieve a desirable solution to the Cyprus problem that has continued 
for more than 30 years.
Without doubt, this is a dangerous gamble and it can cause another 
catastrophe for the people of Cyprus living in both sides of the island. In addition, if 
another war is not litnited within Cyprus theatre and spreads to Turkey and Greece, 
it will endanger the security of the Eastern Mediterranean.
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Significance oj the Greek Cypriot Rearmament: Its Effects on the Security of the 
Eastern Mediterranean
Diiring the Cold War, the Eastern Mediterranean region had quite an 
important place for the security o f Western Europe and the US vis-à-vis their 
antagonist, tlie Soviet Union. More specifically, the region called ‘the South Eastern 
Flank o f NATO’ was vital for the countries of the Western bloc. James Brown 
argued (hat “(he South Eastern Flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
consisting of Greece and Turkey, constitutes one of the principal strategic points of 
the NATO alliance...this region is closer than other sectors o f the NATO to the 
most volatile international tension area o f our time - the Middle East, the Persian
v29Gulf, and unstable...Libya
Nevei theless, the collapse o f the Soviet Union and the resulting end of the 
bipolar systeni had drastic changes for (he security o f the region. With the end of the 
ideological struggle, new political trends and struggles emerged. According to Oya 
Akgonen9 , “the basic security issues facing (he Mediterranean basin states have but 
little changed since the Cold War period’”’’. In the period of complexities that came 
after the Cold War, security issues becanie more complex and (miltidimensional and 
linked to economic, political and cultural issues” .
Within the region o f complexities and uncertainties, the role o f Turkey and 
its relations with its NATO ally Greece is irnportant and influential for the region. 
These two countries make up the Southern Flank o f NATO which can be useful
Ibid. I.
Oya Akgbnen?, “Security Partnership Between Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean 
Region: Mutual Expectations with Regard to the Barcelona Conference-A Turkish Viewpoint,” 
speecli delivered at the First Panel of Security Structures in the Eastern Mediterranean Region 
and the Near Fast Conference (Cairo, October 28, 1997) ed. Thomas Scheben (Konrad- 
Adeiiauer-Stiftung, 1997), 40-41.
” Prof. Dr. Atila Ihalp. Ibid. 141.
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organization logellier with the EU in assisting tlie Eastern Mediterranean in 
establisliing a stable security system. Nevertheless, the tension between these two 
allied counti ies has negative effect on the security o f NATO’s Southern Flank. As 
their disagreement results from the two countries’ disagreement over Cyprus and the 
Aegean’% the Cyprus question becomes indirectly influential for the security o f the 
region.
Many .scholars and many countries present numerous solutions to the 
security problem o f the Eastern Mediterranean. For example, the WEU countries 
offered seveial political and military options to develop the security and stability of 
the region^\ One of these options was to extend NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
project to the Mediterranean. Another one is the Barcelona process which aims at 
the creation o f free trade area and new economic cooperation between the Eastern 
Mediterranean.
Whatever the chosen solution will be, Turkey is an important actor of the 
region that could play an important role in the quest for a stable security system in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. But Turkey has important disadvantages that could 
prevent her from playing that role. These are her inclusion to the long lasting Cyprus 
problem and her problems with Greece.
There is a high possibility that armed confrontation between the Turkish 
Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots o f the island could .spread to Greece and Turkey. 
Accordingly, Richard Haass argues that “...tensions are such that this strategically- 
located island and its 600,000 inhabitants could provoke armed confrontation 
between Greece and Turkey. It is possible to envisage .scenarios...in which Greeks
.Fohii Chipmaii, ed. NATO’s .Soullicm Allies: Internal and External Challenges (London: 
Roiidodge, 1988), 3.18-.1.'t9.
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and Greek Cypriots conclude that the latter have no option but to arm themselves 
further and accept additional forces from Greece. Such a step could lead the Turkish 
government to reinforce its own positions on Cyprus” '^. In addition to what has been 
said the possibility o f an assistance to Greek Cypriots from Greece became legalized 
with the Joint Defence Doctrine o f 1993.
Without doubt, this scenario is quite a pessimistic one which seems not 
highly probable in the near future. More optimistic, but equally problematic, scenario 
is the admission o f Cyprus to the EU without any solution to the Cyprus problem. 
EU is one o f the important actors that can be useful in the establishment of an 
Eastern Mediterranean security system. Nevertheless, to be able to play this role, EU 
must be neutral in its relations with the countries o f the region. According to Oya 
Akgbnen9 , “ If the European states wish to play the role o f a peacemaker in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, they ought to be doubly careful in the formulation and 
implementation o f (heir policies in the area...instead o f becoming pro-Greek in the 
Cyprus question, the EU states should attempt to show their neutrality’”'.
Cyprus's admission to the EU without a solution and the resulting 
integration o f the North o f the island with Turkey will cause new tensions between 
Turkey and EU. Nevertheless, these two countries, even if Turkey is not a member 
of the EU, can contribute to the Eastern Mediterranean security.
According to many, including Rauf Denkta.?, Cyprus itself can play a role 
of ‘bridge’ between different regions. Accordingly, Fatma Gliven-Lisaniler and 
Jonathan Warner argue that “Politicians on both sides o f the Green Line...have 
mentioned the potential o f Cyprus to act as a bridge: as a place through which ideas
”  Scheben. 43.
Richard Ilaa.ss, Alliance PioblenKS in tlie Eastern Mcdilci raiiean-Grcece. Turkey and Cyprus:
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and goods can be carried, from East to West, West to East, North to South and 
South to North”'".
Nevertlieless, increasing rearmament of South Cyprus and the continuous 
deadlock of tlie negotiations results with the continuation of the hostilities between 
Greece and Turkey. No matter what the objective o f the Greek Cypriots is, be it 
either defence and bargaining power at the negotiation table or an attack against the 
North, the increasing rearmament and the import o f weapons worth millions o f 
dollars into the island in the middle of the Eastern Mediterranean can only contribute 
to an increase in the insecurity of the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as in the island 
of Cyprus.
The Cold War era showed that .excessive emphasis on defence and 
rearmament can only increase the possibility of a catastrophe. This is what takes 
place in the island o f Cyprus today. If the leaders of both sides o f the island want to 
act as a ‘bridge’ between East and West and North and South, they have to clean 
that bridge from the mines beforehand.
Part I, ccl. Robert O’neill (Loiulon; Macmillan Pres.s, 1988), 66. 
wScheben. 4.‘)-45.
Fatma GUven-Lisaniler and Jonathan Warner, “Cyprm-Bridge or Bunker? The Cyprus 
Pmhiein and Prospects for its Resolution,” Perceptions. March-May 1998, 8 6 -103.
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